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Abstract 
 
From 1940-1989, a huge rayon factory—at one time the largest in the 
world—operated on the banks of the South Fork of the Shenandoah River in the 
Town of Front Royal, Virginia.  Three different companies owned the facility: 
American Viscose Corporation (AVC) built it in 1939 and ran it until 1963 when 
the Food Machinery Corporation (FMC Corp.) conglomerate purchased AVC.  In 
1976, an FMC executive bought the rayon plant in Front Royal in a leveraged 
buyout, renaming the facility Avtex Fibers, Inc.1    
From early on, the plant had serious problems with waste materials—
including many toxic substances—produced when manufacturing rayon.  
During nearly 50 years of operation, the plant‘s approach to toxic waste was to 
rely on insufficient and frequently outdated procedures and technologies, 
keeping a significant portion of the waste on-site.  The South Fork of the 
Shenandoah, a crucial resource for the rayon plant and important ecological 
entity in its own right, suffered the consequences.   
Although the plant‘s engineers were never able to protect the river, many 
outside people—from sport fishermen to state officials—attempted to do so.  
Over the plant‘s operating life, changes in environmental awareness led to 
changes in law that ultimately caught up with the plant.  In 1989, after years of 
controversy, Avtex Fibers closed its doors.  The operations might have ceased 
sooner were it not for close connections between the rayon plant and the 
                                                 
1
 For the past several decades, news reports and local parlance have referred to the facility as ―the 
Avtex plant,‖ a name now deeply associated with Superfund designation, cost litigation, and site 
remediation.  This study looks beyond the Avtex years and thus utilizes more generic terms like ―the rayon 
plant at Front Royal‖ unless specifically discussing the years when Avtex Fibers, Inc. owned the plant. 
  viii 
military, which granted it a strong degree of protection from environmental 
regulation for most of its operating life.   
This paper examines the entwined histories of the Shenandoah River and 
the rayon factory at Front Royal, especially the origins of its problematic waste 
disposal practices, and focuses on the changing dynamics that ultimately gave 
the health of the river—treated for so many years as a raw material and waste 
receptacle—priority over the factory.  This history provides a microcosm to 
examine human interaction with the encompassing natural world, highlighting 
the limits of human knowledge with regard to predicting environmental 
consequences, the agency of environmental systems, and the possibilities for 
checking the momentum of technological systems that harm the environment. 
 
Figure 1. Map of the Shenandoah River Valley.  The rayon plant at Front Royal was located in 
Warren County, at the confluence of the North and South Forks of the Shenandoah River.  Source: 
United States Geological Survey, “Shenandoah Valley Research Publications,” 
http://va.water.usgs.gov/bib/bib/words_shen.html 
           
 
Introduction 
 
The South Fork of the Shenandoah River crooks a meandering arm 
around 440 acres of floodplain in Front Royal, Virginia.  For forty-nine years on 
that piece of ground, the river supported a major manufacturing facility making 
viscose rayon fiber for consumer and military use.  The two entities—the river 
and the factory—formed a single complex, a hybrid of technological and 
environmental systems.  The rayon produced at Front Royal profited the 
community and played important roles globally, but the prodigious waste 
products from rayon manufacturing polluted not only the river but also 
groundwater, soil, and air.  Despite halting attempts at environmental 
reconciliation, the relationship between river and factory never obtained a 
healthy reciprocity.  As a fundamental component of the rayon plant‘s 
operations and of many Shenandoah Valley communities, the South Fork‘s 
place within the river-plant complex shifted as societal attitudes toward the 
environment changed during the factory‘s operating life.  
In the end, the hybrid relationship ended in a collision of circumstance 
and changing values that paints a picture of human society both hopeful and 
disturbing.  Powerful environmental laws like the 1972 Clean Water Act and 
1980 Superfund law made it increasingly expensive for the facility to pollute, 
and eventually accumulated pressure from state, federal, and citizen groups led 
to the plant‘s closure in 1989.  As of 2010, remediation of the Avtex site under 
the Superfund law continues, with plans to make the land a riverside park and 
business zone. 
Studying the history of rayon production at Front Royal provides both 
literal and metaphorical insights.  The plant and its relationship to the South 
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Fork of the Shenandoah mirror a larger piece of the human experience, offering 
an industrial metaphor for the problematic relationship many human societies 
have with nature.  The concept that people and nature are separate entities is 
merely a trick of perception; as historian William Cronon puts it, ―all 
people…share with each other and with all living and unliving things a single 
earthly home which we identify as the abstraction called nature.‖2  Yet 
conceptualizing the reality that humans are nature can be difficult.  Being so 
wholly dependent on and enmeshed in a vast living system limits our ability to 
completely comprehend it.  Sometimes the wider whole is best understood 
through microcosm. 
 The rayon facility gives us such a view, demonstrating a specific example 
of how human systems rely on broader ecological systems.  The rayon factory 
was a large, complex, technological system, invented and organized by people.  
The South Fork of the Shenandoah River is one small part of the global 
ecosystem and one segment of the Shenandoah River watershed, which 
encompasses roughly 1.5 million acres.3  The process of manufacturing rayon 
depended entirely on water supplied by the South Fork.  If the river suddenly 
went dry, the factory would immediately cease to function. 
 Sadly, the rayon plant‘s relationship to the river mimicked the common 
response of many human societies to nature.  While some individuals at the 
plant made real effort to protect the river from toxic discharges, the overall 
corporate attitude during the plant‘s operating life placed minimal importance 
                                                 
2
 William Cronon, Nature’s Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Co., 1991), 19. 
 
3
 Potomac Watershed Partnership, ―Shenandoah River,‖ 
http://www.potomacwatershed.net/ijourney/shenando/shenando.html (accessed February 14, 2010). 
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on the health of aquatic life.  The South Fork was a means to an end, an 
industrial extractive resource.  The companies that operated the plant over its 
forty-nine year history followed components of federal and state environmental 
laws to a minimal degree, often paying off fines rather than repairing problems.  
Protection of the river ranked low on the operators‘ priority list, and military 
demand for some of the plant‘s products further complicated the relationship.  
In other words, the factory treated the river as we, societally, treat nature: a 
resource to be used, a vague concept in the back of our minds—far below profit, 
jobs, or family—that becomes a priority only when problems arise, such as 
contaminated drinking water, fish kills, or a river turned rank and milky white.  
The interaction between society and nature is most visible and concrete 
in certain elements of the rayon plant‘s story, where the friction and disparity 
within the river-plant complex becomes most evident.  Chapter one explores the 
histories possessed by each entity: the factory‘s genealogy of technology and 
concomitant waste on the one hand, and the river‘s geological epic and 
attendant human use on the other.  Chapter two examines the important global 
role played by the river-plant complex during World War II and the steep price 
paid by the South Fork.  During this era, the interests of the factory dominated; 
the river was largely treated as an extractive resource and a static waste 
receptacle.   
The chapters three and four explain how rayon manufacturing creates 
toxic wastes and examine the rayon plant‘s early attempts to deal with that 
material.  The fifth chapter considers the shift in dynamics between the river 
and the factory following World War II as concerns about the South Fork and 
the environment in general increased.  For sport fishermen, the South Fork 
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afforded a different kind of resource, one that required clean water and healthy 
aquatic life.  After the war, fishermen began to advocate on the river‘s behalf, 
successfully lobbying for Virginia‘s first water quality law.  The factory 
managers‘ attempts to adjust to new regulatory oversight continued for the 
remainder of the plant‘s operating life as the American response to 
environmental problems shifted, producing stricter pollution control legislation.  
The chapter also explores how regulation of toxics at the rayon plant displaced 
some of the waste to locations where it continued to cause harm. 
  Shifting dynamics between river and factory took place in predictable 
physical zones of interaction between plant and river, such as the wastewater 
treatment plant and the land surrounding the factory.  But they occurred 
further afield as well—in courtrooms and negotiations with military officials, the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Commonwealth of Virginia—
interactions that redefined the concept of the river, of hazardous waste, and of 
harm.  Chapter six discusses events in all of these arenas that finally halted the 
technological momentum of the rayon plant, leading to its closure in 1989.   
Throughout the factory‘s forty-nine years of operation, the number of 
protections and advocates for the river increased, but its status as an 
independent ecological system remained on the periphery for the companies 
operating the plant, and even, it seems, for the regulatory bodies.  Although 
regulatory permitting and monitoring provided tools for protection, the burden 
of proof remained on the river.  Damage to it had to be quantifiable before 
action could be taken.  Problems below a certain, somewhat arbitrary, threshold 
could be ignored.  The power balance between technological and ecological 
systems in the river-plant complex remained lop-sided, a result perhaps of a 
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technological momentum inscribed with the attitudes and design flaws that 
initiated the waste problems at the Front Royal plant.  This study concludes 
with a discussion of how human actions can check technological momentum, 
and how precautionary measures can provide healthy inertia to the momentum 
of future technological systems.   
The concept of technological momentum originates with historian 
Thomas Hughes; his writings on technology provide important architecture and 
vocabulary to this study.  Hughes defines technological systems on a broad 
scale, using large and complex entities, such as the U.S. electric grid, as his 
examples.  Nevertheless, his approach translates well for smaller units of 
technology, including the rayon plant in Front Royal.  Despite its self-contained 
appearance, the technological system of this river-plant complex extended far 
beyond the facility itself.  The system included predictable components, such as 
the physical infrastructure of the plant and the machines used to spin, wash, 
and stretch rayon fibers.  Transportation infrastructure, especially the railroad, 
connected the factory to suppliers and purchasers.   
But multiple additional entities were also part of the larger technological 
system, including all three companies that owned and operated the rayon 
facility, as well as banks that financed expansions, educational facilities that 
trained employees, unions that represented workers, and more.  Going further 
afield, Hughes also suggests that technological systems include ―legislative 
artifacts.‖4  At the Front Royal plant, state and federal laws regarding a broad 
range of topics—from military procurement, labor issues, and taxes, to worker 
                                                 
4
 Thomas P. Hughes, ―The Evolution of Large Technological Systems,‖ in The Social 
Constructions of Technological Systems: New Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology, ed. 
Wiebe E. Bijker, Thomas P. Hughes, and Trevor J. Pinch (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1987), 51. 
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safety, environmental protection, and import-export restrictions—all shaped 
decision-making by managers and workers throughout its operating life.   
Finally, Hughes argues that natural resources, when ―they are socially 
constructed and adapted to function in systems,… also qualify as system 
artifacts.‖5  Viscose rayon production combined a variety of natural resources, 
all of them transformed from their original state before arriving at the plant.  
Cellulose from tree fiber was a primary ingredient for viscose.  Made from 
chipped and pulped softwood trees harvested in Alaska, Canada, and the Pacific 
Northwest, the cellulose arrived at the factory already pressed into thick white 
sheets resembling blotting paper.6  The production process also involved 
multiple chemicals, synthesized off-site from various raw materials and 
delivered to Front Royal via gas lines and railroad tank cars.  Mining techniques 
to dig the coal that powered on-site turbines intensified in environmental 
impact during the rayon plant‘s lifetime, from deep mines to strip mines.  
Limestone used in the wastewater treatment plant also had to be mined, 
cleaned, and transported.   
Charting the flow of materials and resources into the rayon plant paints 
a miniature version of William Cronon‘s depiction of Chicago in Nature’s 
Metropolis.  The resources required to manufacture this one product shaped 
landscapes across the U.S., each linked to Front Royal and the rayon market by 
miles of railroad track.  Like the meat packing plants in 19th century Chicago, 
behind the Front Royal factory and the skeins of rayon it produced ―were the 
                                                 
5
 Ibid. 
 
6
 American Viscose Division/Fiber Operation, ―Welcome to FMC-Front Royal,‖ Pamphlet, Avtex 
Collection, Local #371T Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union Papers (Union Papers); Laura 
V. Hale Archives. Warren County Heritage Society. Front Royal, VA (WHS). 
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ghost landscapes that had given it birth.‖7  Perhaps the most haunting 
landscape was that immediately surrounding the rayon facility.  Like the 
Chicago factories, the rayon plant could not adequately process or safely 
dispose of its byproducts and waste.  The nearby land and river bore the brunt 
of this excess. 
 Of all the natural resources that supplied the rayon plant, the water of 
the South Fork was the least processed and the least transformed.8  The rayon 
plant required a river; it could not have functioned away from a consistent 
water source.  Thus, river water did not require long-distance transport and 
needed only modest treatment for use in the plant and power house.  It was a 
truly raw material, not requiring chemical synthesis, mining, logging, pulping, 
pressing, or shipment across the nation.  Unique among the other natural 
resources used at the factory, the river‘s water also played a dual role as a 
resource for extraction and receptacle for waste.  Thus, the river was not just a 
raw material, it was also a place—what historian Joel Tarr calls a ―sink,‖ where 
wastes can be ―disposed of in the cheapest and most convenient way possible.‖9  
Transactions between the river-plant hybrid occurred within a physical zone of 
overlap, a space where the river was simultaneously adapted to the functions of 
the plant while still functioning as part of a larger ecosystem. 
                                                 
7
 Cronon, 263.  
 
8
 It appears Avtex filtered the river water and used rock salt as a water softener.  See Susan Groves 
and Frank Settle, ―The Avtex Saga: National Security versus Environmental Protection,‖ Journal of 
Chemical Education 79, no. 6 (June 2002), 686; and Richard K. Daniels, ―Avtex Fibers Rayon Plant,‖ 
http://ourworld.compuserve.com/ homepages/rdaniels2/layout2.htm (accessed May 8, 2009).  Note that this 
CompuServe server shut down on July 6, 2009. 
 
9
 Joel A. Tarr, The Search for the Ultimate Sink: Urban Pollution in Historical Perspective 
(Akron, OH: University of Akron Press, 1996), 385. 
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Hughes identifies a powerful force that helps to clarify the reasons 
behind the factory‘s dominance of the river-plant complex for most of its 
operating life: the momentum of technological systems.  Using the language of 
physics, he ascribes mass to the organizational elements of a technological 
system, direction to the goals of a system, and velocity to its growth rate.  As a 
result, ―mature systems have a quality that is analogous… to inertia of 
motion.‖10  This helps to explain the factory‘s longevity in spite of the pollutants 
the plant discharged into the river even as social values shifted to emphasize 
the importance of environmental protection.  The technological system that 
both incorporated and emanated from rayon production created multiple 
buffers, as the company provided jobs, tax revenue, political contributions, and 
so on.  The most powerful buffer, however, came from military interests.  
During its forty-nine year operating life, the Front Royal facility 
manufactured two militarily critical products: high tenacity rayon tire cord for 
World War II operations and carbonizable rayon for missiles and other 
aerospace purposes during the Cold War years.  The momentum acquired from 
this component of rayon‘s technological system single-handedly kept the plant 
in operation in its final years.  The socially constructed dichotomy between 
national security and environmental concern multiplied the difficulty of 
effectively regulating the plant‘s pollution.  The military rayon products webbed 
the factory and the Front Royal community into the global technological system 
of weapons manufacturing, from tank tires during World War II to nuclear 
warheads carried on missiles built with Front Royal rayon.  Environmental 
                                                 
10
 Huges, ―The Evolution of Large Technological Systems,‖ 77. 
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protection, therefore faced vastly amplified obstacles due to the ―conservative 
momentum of the military-industrial-complex‖11 and its global implications.   
Part of Hughes‘ explanation for this contributes another valuable concept 
to this study.  The momentum of technological systems includes social 
influences from the times in which they originated; these values, attitudes, and 
intentions also have a different kind of ―inertia, [that of] conservative 
momentum.‖12  Likewise, the physical components of a system ―project into the 
future the socially constructed characteristics acquired in the past when they 
were designed.‖13  Hughes theorizes that characteristics adapted to the social 
values of a certain time period continue into the present due to technological 
momentum.  By the late 1980s, the factory carried with it, in the decaying 
buildings and chemical waste disposal system, not just the basic 
manufacturing infrastructure of the 1930s (and before) but also the values and 
expectations of those times.  More significantly, it carried internal bureaucratic 
expectations from its earliest years of operation—World War II and immediately 
after—when chemistry and industry had won the war and operated within an 
environment of patriotic enthusiasm and self-regulation.  Cold War values 
emphasizing military preparedness and massive weapons systems reinforced 
these technological learned behaviors.  
Hughes has suggested that only counter-momentum of equal force could 
change the imperative of such massive systems of values, goals, expectations, 
                                                 
11
 Thomas P. Hughes, American Genesis: A Century of Invention and Technological Enthusiasm, 
1870-1970 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 460. 
  
12
 Hughes, American Genesis, 459. 
 
13
 Hughes, ―The Evolution of Large Technological Systems,‖ 77. 
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and military demand.14  But the technological system of rayon production in 
Front Royal broke down not because of a unified counter-momentum, but due 
to a slipshod collection of cumulative but highly-contingent events.  Within that 
process are the stories of multiple smaller counterforces, growing over the same 
decades, nudging at the plant‘s managers to address its pollution problems.  
Many entities within the rayon plant‘s technological system—particularly state 
regulatory agencies and politicians—initially helped to facilitate the plant‘s 
continued operations, but then, in the final days, shifted sides to respond to 
other forces, other socially constructed values of newer times.   
In one sense, the multiple forces countering rayon production‘s 
momentum at Front Royal plant did have a degree of unity, in that they 
coalesced around the question of the river.  The river was the bellwether and 
whistleblower; it clanged the alarm bell and provided the data to quantify the 
toxic discharges of the factory, its unhealthy human-built appendage.  For the 
most part, the people who responded on the river‘s behalf did so seeking some 
kind of ―extractive‖ or consumptive gain, based in personal desire, political 
expediency, economic interest, or some combination of these.  For some, the 
situation at the rayon plant replicated a trend that grew out of the technological 
explosion following World War II.  Historian Adam Rome explains that some 
Americans began to see ―the new machinery of production as a threat to the 
new dream of consumption.‖15  Along the Shenandoah, these new dreams 
                                                 
14
 For example, in American Genesis, Hughes theorizes that ―in order to bring about a substantial 
change in the motion and direction of massive systems of production… a counterforce of comparable 
magnitude becomes imperative,‖ 461-462. 
 
15
Adam Rome, The Bulldozer in the Countryside: Suburban Sprawl and the Rise of American 
Environmentalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 5.  
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embraced such things as sport fishing and other recreational activities, and 
enjoyment of the river‘s aesthetic values as tourists or landowners.  Such 
connections between human desires and a healthy natural world are crucial 
components for stirring environmental protection, but there remains another 
side of the river: a space where it escapes the embrace of human desire or 
social construction and exists unto itself, feeding a far broader range of life than 
just the human species. 
Alongside the socially constructed idea of the river and its extractive 
uses, the biological reality of the river exists with its own complicated causes 
and effects, its own balance and dynamism.  Many voices have spoken to this 
dualism.  Richard White, for example, concluded from his study of the 
Columbia River that ―no matter how much we have created many of its spaces 
and altered its behavior, [the river] is still tied to larger organic cycles beyond 
our control… the river has purposes of its own which do not readily yield to 
desires to maximize profit.‖16  In her paradigm-shifting 1962 book, Silent Spring, 
Rachel Carson reflected upon this fluidity, writing ―seldom if ever does Nature 
operate in closed and separate compartments, and she has not done so in 
distributing the earth‘s water supply.‖17  The South Fork of the Shenandoah 
and its ecological system carry a physical momentum of their own, interwoven 
with the human-built world and also existing beyond it.  The momentum of the 
river, like nature itself, is what humans too often fail to grasp, for it is diffuse, 
                                                 
16
 Richard White, The Organic Machine: The Remaking of the Columbia River (New York: Hill 
and Wang, 1995), 112. 
 
17
 Rachel Carson, Silent Spring (Greenwich, CT: Fawcett Publications, Inc., 1962), 47. 
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connected in wider and more intricate ways than we are usually conditioned to 
detect.   
The science of ecology provides terms that help convey something of this 
complexity and of the river‘s existence in a context that subsumes the human-
built world.  The term ―ecology‖ is relatively new to our lexicon, coined in 1873 
to describe the study of interactions between plants, animals, and their 
habitats.18  An ecological system, or ecosystem, may refer to these organisms 
and interactions in a specific area, or something larger: the planetary 
ecosystem.  Other terms express both the immensity and limits of natural 
systems.  The definition of the ―biosphere,‖ another late 19the century term, is 
―the global sum of all ecosystems,‖ and ―the thin layer near earth‘s surface that 
contains all known life.‖19  Our poet-scientists name these phenomena in 
language that speaks to our senses.  Rachel Carson writes, ―Water, soil, and the 
earth‘s green mantle of plants make up the world that supports the animal life 
of the earth,‖20 and the land, Aldo Leopold adds, ―is a fountain of energy flowing 
through a circuit of soils, plants, and animals.‖21  
Even in a relatively contained ecosystem like the Shenandoah River, the 
process of cataloging the organisms and interactions that drive this fountain of 
energy is an immense task.  On the broad scale, the ecosystem embraces the 
river‘s watershed: all the river‘s surface and ground water tributaries, all the 
                                                 
18
 ―Ecology,‖ Etymology Dictionary Online, http://www.etymonline.com/ (accessed February 21, 
2010); and T.F. Hoad, ―ecology,‖ The Concise Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology, 1996, 
Encyclopedia.com (February 21, 2010). 
 
19
 Gretchen C. Daily, ed. Nature’s Services: Societal Dependence on Natural Ecosystems 
(Washington, DC: Island Press, 1997), 2, 4.  
 
20
 Carson, 64;   
 
21
 Aldo Leopold, A Sand County almanac: with essays on conservation from Round River (New 
York: Ballantine Books, 1970), 253.  
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soil and plants that filter rainwater.  Indeed, everything that exists within the 
watershed is part of the watershed, including roads and houses.  On the 
opposite end of the scale are microscopic organisms—bacteria and molecules of 
oxygen and nitrogen, and the benthic macroinvertebrates—mayflies and 
mussels and many species in between—that live on the river bottom, feeding on 
fallen leaves and other organic matter.22  Multiple species of fish feed on the 
macroinvertebrates and on each other.  Then there are creatures, from birds to 
bears, who feed on the fish, as well as all manner of plant life that relies on the 
river.  Humans are also in the mix, of course, many of us never considering that 
we live within a watershed and that our daily choices may directly impact the 
Shenandoah River ecosystem.  The river simultaneously includes us and exists 
beyond us, with its own purposes.  Understanding what happened at the rayon 
plant in Front Royal requires consideration of the history and momentum of 
both the river and the plant.  
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Chapter 1 
Origins of the River and the Factory 
 
The history of the Shenandoah River begins far beyond human 
constructs, deep in the bedrock of geologic time.  The river is part of an ancient 
landscape of oceans, volcanoes, and vast tectonic shifts.  The very oldest 
exposed rocks in the Blue Ridge Mountains formed roughly 1.2 billion years 
ago.  A shallow ocean covered what is now the Shenandoah Valley and the 
eastern U.S. for roughly 400 million years, laying down sediment and sea shells 
that compacted into layers of shales and limestones.  The sea began to recede 
about 350 million years ago, leaving swamps and meandering rivers in its wake.  
Another vast shift came 275 million years ago when the continents of Africa and 
North America collided, folding and breaking and shoving the flat sedimentary 
rocks, building the mountains that surround the Shenandoah Valley over the 
course of the next several million years.23     
With the formation of the Appalachians, and for the recent 240 million 
years, erosion has shaped, formed, and reformed the limestone, sandstone, 
granite, and greenstone rocks into the mountains and valleys of today.  The 
Shenandoah River does not have a birthdate because it is part of all the 
geological processes that shaped the landscape.  Many of its tributaries flow 
underground, through fissures in limestone laid down during the era of the 
great shallow inland sea.  The river‘s curves, depths, and shallows conform to 
rock types configured by mountain building, curling around ridges that resist 
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erosion and carving down through softer rocks.24  The Shenandoah River and 
its tributaries shape every natural feature of the landscape.  From ground level, 
the river‘s influence may be only marginally apparent, but viewed from above, 
ecological and landscape patterns become more evident, and ―stream valleys are 
seen to dominate‖ the land.25      
The river has a ecological history outside of human influence, based in 
geological change, weather events—including droughts and floods—as well as 
the interplay of organisms within the river and surrounding it.  Yet human 
activities have played a drastic and dramatic role in the river‘s history.  The 
earliest evidence of human interaction with the river dates back over 11,000 
years when paleo-indians camped, hunted, and quarried stones for arrowheads 
along the South Fork.  Archeological digs near Front Royal uncovered post 
holes from what may be the oldest structures in North America.26  In 1699, 
John Lederer crossed the Blue Ridge at Manassas Gap near Front Royal, 
becoming the first documented European explorer to view the Shenandoah 
Valley.  From then on, the river and its landscape gained names inscribed in 
written histories.  
These now familiar names mark out the geography of the Shenandoah 
River system.  Beginning in the upper reaches of Virginia‘s two great mountain 
ranges, the Blue Ridge and Allegheny, the river‘s watershed runs roughly 150 
miles from south of Waynesboro to the confluence with the Potomac River at 
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Harpers Ferry.  The major tributaries are all directional in name.  The South 
Fork has roots in both mountain ranges: Blue Ridge streams collect into the 
South River, and the North and Middle Rivers originate in the folded eastern 
front of the Allegheny Mountains.  The three converge near Port Republic, 
becoming the South Fork of the Shenandoah.  The river curves northward, 
continuously carving the Page Valley between the erosion-resistant granites in 
the Blue Ridge and sandstones in Massanutten mountain.27  Meanwhile, the 
North Fork draws a fan of tributaries down from the Alleghenies and weaves 
them into deep ox bows that skirt the western side of Massanutten.  The two 
undulating forks finally meet to form the main stem of the Shenandoah River a 
scant two miles downstream of the now-closed rayon plant site.   
 
Figure 2.  Flooding at the confluence of the North and South Rivers at Port Republic.   Photo by the 
author. 
                                                 
27
 ―The Potomac-Shenandoah System,‖ The Geology of Virginia: Rivers & Watersheds, William 
and Mary Department of Geology.  http://web.wm.edu/geology/virginia/rivers/potomac-
shenandoah.html?svr=www (accessed May 4, 2009). 
 
  
17 
In 1937, American Viscose Corporation purchased 440 acres of land 
beside the South Fork of the Shenandoah in Front Royal, Virginia to build its 
largest rayon plant.  At first thought, a hulking industrial plant on the banks of 
the Shenandoah may seem somehow incongruous.  The Shenandoah River and 
the valley it carved are fabled places in America, the lyrical name woven into 
folk songs and images from a history that borders on legend: the Knights of the 
Golden Horseshoe expedition getting drunk on the river bank in 1716, a young 
George Washington hard at work surveying the valley, the famed breadbasket of 
the Confederacy in flames during the Civil War.  The name Shenandoah also 
belongs to a nearby national park, evoking forests garlanded with autumn 
colors, a beautiful land.  Upon seeing the Alleghenies on the far side of the 
valley for the first time, John Lederer wrote that he ―could hardly discern 
whether they were mountains or clouds.‖28  Perhaps they were both.  There is 
truth in the romantic visions; the Valley, mountains, and river are the United 
States of America‘s original frontier, and they are lovely, inspiring the poetic 
imagination.  But the Shenandoah River has been put to work by humans for 
centuries.  It shares the encroachments and aquatic tragedies of any industrial 
river.   
Humans have used the broad, flat Shenandoah Valley as a thoroughfare 
for millennia.  Many major modern day roads follow long-distance Native 
American trails.  One of these, now called the Valley Pike or Route 11, runs 
roughly north and south through the Valley.  Multiple east-west trails are now 
also paved, passing through wind and water gaps in the mountains.  Geography 
made the Front Royal area a crossroads for human travel early on.  The 
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Manassas and Chester Gaps in the Blue Ridge allowed travelers to approach 
from the east.  The Valley Pike and both forks of the Shenandoah River lay just 
to the west.  This confluence of transport combined with a hydrological 
situation to make Front Royal an early center of trade.  At a curve in the river 
near the present day Avtex site, the water slows down, depositing alluvial 
sediment, eroded off the mountains and valley.29  The resulting shallows, called 
―The Flats,‖ were an easy and convenient spot to pull canoes, and later barges, 
ashore.  Native Americans built a fish weir near the site and gathered there to 
fish, process fish, and trade.  Cleanup efforts at the Avtex site in the 1990s and 
2000s uncovered numerous arrowheads and other Native American artifacts. 
During colonial times, European settlers in the Shenandoah Valley 
produced crops and other resources for trade within the colonies and export to 
England, including timber, iron, hemp, grain, and flour.  The river powered 
grain mills and iron furnaces and served as the main avenue for trade.  Port 
Republic and Bridgewater (originally called Bridgeport) were loading points for 
transport of goods heading downstream on the South and North Forks of the 
Shenandoah.  Settlers shipped their goods to market by gundalows, flat-
bottomed barges that were poled downstream and then dismantled; the crew 
sold the wood then walked back home.  The Flats again became a destination 
where gundalow drivers would empty their cargo into the carts of merchants 
who transported the goods through Manassas Gap to eastern markets at 
                                                 
29
 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, ―Record of Decision, Decision Summary,‖ [n.d., 
1988?], Avtex Administrative Record, EPA. http://loggerhead.epa.gov/arweb/public/pdf/135790.pdf 
(accessed May 7, 2009): 1. 
 
  
19 
Alexandria and Dumphries.  The Flats remained a transfer point when the 
railroad came to Front Royal in 1854.30   
After the Revolutionary War, the Shenandoah River and its Valley 
continued as key resource caches for trade and consumption.  For example, the 
Patowmack Company formed in 1785 with support from George Washington; in 
an effort to make the Shenandoah more navigable, the company dredged the 
river bottom and blasted rock to widen the river‘s channel.  The company also 
built V-shaped dams in shallow parts of the river.  An opening in the center of 
the dam increased flow, allowing easier passage for barges.31  Human 
manipulation of the river for commercial purposes increased in intensity over 
time.  The twentieth century brought heavier industry to the river and its 
tributaries.  Beginning in 1922, Wampler Foods initiated industrial poultry 
production in Rockingham County.  E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company 
purchased land beside the South River in Waynesboro, relying on river water to 
manufacture acetate rayon beginning in 1929.32  In addition, communities 
along the river used the South Fork and its tributaries for both drinking water 
and disposal of contaminants, such as sewage and industrial discharges.33  
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When the American Viscose facility opened in 1940, people had used, polluted, 
and relied on the Shenandoah for centuries. 
When American Viscose Corporation employees scouted the 440 acre site 
on the banks of the South Fork in 1937, they were operating in familiar 
territory.  Twenty years earlier in Roanoke, Virginia, the company opened what 
was at that time the largest rayon plant in the world.34  The rayon industry as a 
whole had a heavy presence in the state.  By 1941, American Viscose plants in 
Roanoke and Front Royal and an Industrial Rayon Corporation factory in 
Covington manufactured viscose rayon; Celanese Corporation of America near 
Narrows produced an acetate rayon yarn; and E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 
with plants in Waynesboro, Ampthill, and Martinsville, manufactured both 
acetate and viscose rayon fibers, as well as cellophane.35  In the late 1940s 
through the mid-50s, ―value added‖ for synthetic fibers production in Virginia 
was second only to tobacco.36 
These industries connected into a larger technological system during the 
early twentieth century in which southern state governments offered economic 
incentives to support industrial expansion in their states.  Virginia as a whole 
had quantities of ―cheap and radical-free labor,‖ as well as ―lenient industrial 
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relations policies.‖37  Front Royal‘s Town Manager, L.B. Dutrow, told a reporter 
in 1938, ―We were told that the representatives [of American Viscose] also had 
been looking over a site in North Carolina, but that they liked the Virginia tax 
laws better.‖  He noted that they expressed particular interest in the location of 
the 440 acres: about three-quarters of a mile outside of town (at that time) and 
adjacent to both the railroad and the river.38  Alongside direct financial 
supports for their industrial endeavors, many southern states offered 
companies virtually free reign with regard to natural resources.39  Water was 
one of the key extractive resources that southern40 states could offer.  
Oftentimes, industries selected rural sites where water and other raw materials 
were abundant and chemical discharges into air, land, and water would attract 
less notice.  The Front Royal site, located in a rural region and in close 
proximity to the South Fork, offered American Viscose all these benefits, along 
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with a solid transportation infrastructure, tax incentives, cooperative labor, and 
a business-friendly political climate.  More than anything else, however, 
American Viscose wanted the river.   
Rayon manufacturing uses massive quantities of water.  Current 
production methods require 175 gallons of treated water to produce one pound 
of rayon.  Producing two million pounds of rayon annually required one million 
gallons of treated water per day.41  The Front Royal plant opened in 1940 (see 
fig. 3) designed to produce 75 million pounds of rayon per year,42 thus 
requiring—at full capacity—daily water input of somewhere in the ballpark of 
37.5 million gallons.  The manufacturing process required water to dissolve 
caustic soda to break down cellulose; water in large quantities washed rayon 
threads and diluted chemicals; it cleaned waste materials out of the plant and 
joined forces with coal to power the facility‘s steam turbines.  Water treatment 
procedures, used at various times over the plant‘s operating life, also required 
additional amounts of water.  Thus, in actuality, total water use in the early 
1940s may have been quite a bit higher than 38 million gallons per day. 
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Figure 3.  The Front Royal rayon plant in 1943, under the ownership of American Viscose 
Corporation.  Courtesy of Warren Heritage Society. 
 
 
Understanding the origins of the product manufactured at the rayon 
plant—viscose rayon—illuminates the depth of the facility‘s reliance on the 
river.  The story began in the distant past at an unlikely crossroads: the 
intersection of human desire for status, comfort and luxury with the 
reproductive strategy of a species of grey moth, Bombyx mori, the silk worm.  
The moth‘s larvae ate white mulberry leaves and spun out a fine thread to 
weave cocoons.  Silk making interrupted this process by boiling the cocoons 
and caterpillars, then unwinding the fine threads and twisting them into thicker 
strands for weaving.  The ancient practice of silk production began in China 
thousands of years ago, and as a rare and exotic fabric, silk was favored among 
the wealthy across the Middle East and Europe.  From early on, rulers sought 
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to develop silk industries in their own countries or to control production 
abroad.  Some scientists tried another avenue toward textile dominance: 
creating man-made, silk-like fibers.  In the early 1800s, an epidemic disease 
fatal to silkworms decimated the European sericulture industry43 and further 
stimulated interest in creating a synthetic substitute.   
English scientist Dr. Robert Hooke first proposed the general method for 
manufacturing rayon.  In a 1664 book titled Micrographia, he wrote: 
I have often thought that probably there might be a way found 
out, to make an artificial glutinous composition, much resembling, 
if not full as good, nay better, than that excrement, or whatever 
other substance it be out of which the silkworm wire-draws his 
clew.  If such a composition were found, it were certainly an easy 
matter to find very quick ways of drawing it out into small wires 
for use. 44 
 
Decades later, in the 1740s, French scientist René de Réaumur, who might 
today be titled an entomologist, published Mémoirs pour Servir à l’Historie des 
Insects in which he considered the possibility of threads made of chemical 
varnish that would resemble silk in ―brilliancy and strength.‖45   
 Scientists working in the 19th century sought to mimic the glutinous 
―excrement‖ of the silkworm by dissolving various types of fiber in various 
chemicals.  The chemists who made the most progress were in search of light 
bulb filaments, not textiles.  An English chemist named Sir Joseph Wilson 
Swan—most famous for his invention of the incandescent light bulb—dissolved 
nitrocellulose in acetic acid, then forced it though a small hole into a 
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coagulating bath of alcohol.  The fibers produced were not only effective for 
filaments; they were also considered the first artificial silk.  Using this 
procedure as a starting point, various chemists sought to perfect the process.  
Count Hilaire de Bernigaud de Chardonnet had the first commercial success in 
1885, followed by a German company in 1899.46   
 The viscose method for producing rayon emerged in Britain in the late 
1800s, eventually becoming the industry standard.  Charles Cross, Edward 
Bevan, and Clayton Beadle devised and patented the first viscose in 1892.  They 
treated cellulose from tree fiber with sodium hydroxide—a strongly alkaline 
substance commonly known as caustic soda or lye—in order to ―swell the fiber‖ 
and create a thick solution.  The resulting substance was dissolved with carbon 
disulfide, creating a ―thick, straw-colored solution having the viscose 
consistency of honey or molasses.‖47  The three men patented this viscose-
production process, but it took two additional inventors to perfect a procedure 
for spinning viable viscose thread.   
Englishman Charles Stearn headed the Zurich Incandescence Lamp 
Company in London, but Charles Topham, his assistant, was the real 
innovator.  They experimented, unsuccessfully at first, by extruding the viscose 
substance through a spinneret and into an acid bath for hardening.  Initially, 
the fibers were too weak to spin, but Topham discovered that aging the viscose 
before extruding and spinning created viable fibers.48  Topham also invented a 
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pump to regulate the flow of viscose to the spinnerets, as well as a spinning box 
that caught the rayon filaments, wound them into yarn, and collected them into 
a ―cake.‖49  These same products and procedures became key to the 
technological system comprising the rayon industry.  Machines based on 
Topham‘s model and reproduced on a mass scale were in use at the Front Royal 
plant when it closed in 1989. 
Just as the invention of viscose rayon proceeded by trial and error, so too 
did the industry itself.  The American Viscose Corporation (AVC), owner of the 
Front Royal plant from 1938-1963, originated as a subsidiary of the Courtaulds 
family‘s dynasty in the British textile business.  Courtaulds held the first patent 
on the British process for making viscose rayon and for years dominated the 
market in viscose fabric both at home and in the U.S.50  However, for several 
years after obtaining the patent, Courtaulds‘ ability to manufacture 
commercial-grade viscose rayon was by no means certain.  Developing a large-
scale commercially successful viscose rayon industry  had a multidirectional 
character. 51  Like the process of invention and experimentation used by 
Topham, Stern, and others before them to develop viscose rayon, Courtaulds 
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met failures and dead-ends that shaped decisions and technological 
developments.   
In 1782, George Courtauld initiated the family‘s association with fabric 
production when he set up a business in London as a silk-throwster, twisting 
threads of raw silk to make them suitable for weaving.  His son built a silk mill 
in 1816 that became extremely profitable manufacturing crêpe silk, a popular 
material for mourning clothes in the Victorian era.  The Courtaulds‘ 
involvement with viscose rayon production commenced in 1904 when the 
company purchased British patent rights for the manufacture of textile yarn 
using Topham and Stern‘s viscose method.     
Although the discovery of ―artificial silk‖52 was several years old at that 
time, no company had successfully fabricated commercial quantities.  Indeed, 
several had attempted to do so using the Topham and Stern method but found 
the process unreliable.  Courtaulds, Ltd. too struggled with multiple problems.  
Production of useable quantities fluctuated wildly, and yarns tended to be 
flammable or explosive if not properly processed.  Often threads were 
excessively hard and would neither cohere nor dye evenly.  A Courtaulds 
manager complained of viscose rayon in 1906: ―the material is no use for 
weaving.‖  They could not produce top grade product, nor find a market for the 
material.  Between 1905 and 1907, Courtaulds‘ first rayon plant, located in 
Coventry, England, turned no profit.  The company‘s focus instead turned to 
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research, attempting to reinvent the Stearn and Topham method to allow for 
commercial production. 53 
Courtaulds‘ experimentation proved the need to refine and adjust almost 
every component of Stearn and Topham‘s viscose rayon process.  Determining 
the proper composition of the chemical spinning bath proved to be the greatest 
challenge.54  A patent dispute exacerbated the problem by hampering the 
company‘s ability to experiment with certain chemical combinations. However, 
in 1907, one of Courtaulds‘ in-house chemists discovered that adding glucose 
to a spinning bath of sulphuric acid created an attractive and flexible spun 
yarn.  Problems with creating  consistently high-quality material persisted until 
company chemists found that combining zinc sulphate with the acid bath led to 
more uniform production and made ―a remarkable difference to the quantity, 
feel, and appearance of the viscose threads.‖55   
During this time period, Courtaulds‘ scientists also struggled to find a 
dependable procedure to generate high quality viscose to the supply the plant.  
Minor discrepancies caused major problems: ―variations in wood-pulp, 
variations in the conditions of steeping, variations in temperature, variations in 
ageing: all were capable of producing a viscose virtually incapable of being spun 
into yarn.‖  A marked decline in top quality yarn in the spring of 1909 was 
traced to excavations for new construction at the Courtaulds‘ facility.  These 
disturbances caused a slight drop in temperature in the factory cellars used for 
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storing viscose.  Though the viscose could be spun, the small temperature 
variance made the finished product low grade.  Through such ―zig-zag‖ 
patterns, Courtaulds‘ chemists pieced together a picture of the conditions 
required to produce top quality viscose for a high quality yarn. 56    
 Between 1905 and 1913, the years of experimentation and 
consolidation, rayon became Courtaulds‘ core product, with profits outstripping 
those from silk and other fabrics.  For the most part, the company now 
manufactured yarns for sale to textile companies rather than fabrics for 
consumers.  Courtaulds‘ engineers, who designed looms and mills for weaving 
silk, continued to play an important role in the company, but rayon 
manufacturing placed company chemists in a central position.  The Coventry 
plant had its own laboratory in which experimentation on spinning baths and 
viscose occurred.  Consolidation of the viscose manufacturing process and its 
reliance on rigorous control of chemical processes resulted in expansion of the 
size and staff of Courtaulds‘ laboratories.  Rayon and the technology required to 
produce it transformed Courtaulds from ―a textile firm into a chemical firm with 
a textile branch.‖57   
Courtaulds initially sold much of their rayon material for decorative 
braid, embroidery thread, ties, scarves, and pom-poms to decorate children‘s 
hats.58  With growing market success in Britain, the company began to explore 
purchase of U.S. patent rights on viscose rayon production in 1907.  Another 
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series of fits and starts occurred over the next three years as the company 
negotiated purchase of patent rights, located land and labor for a new factory, 
and assembled a management team in the U.S.  The company‘s efforts gained 
urgency with word of a proposed new tariff act (passed in 1909) in the U.S. 
Congress that would raise duties on imported artificial silk by 30% or more.  If 
Courtaulds could ―get in behind the tariff wall,‖ as sole owners of the U.S. 
patent, the company would have essentially no competition in the States until 
the last of their patent rights expired in 1921.59  The company purchased land 
on the Delaware River in Marcus Hook, Pennsylvania and, in 1910, 
incorporated the American Viscose Company (also known as Avisco or AVC).60   
By 1915, AVC was tremendously profitable, surpassing the rayon output 
of Courtaulds.61  Initially, most of the product continued to be used for 
decorative fibers as well as knit goods, particularly men‘s socks.  Rayon‘s mass 
popularity in the U.S., however, began with women‘s stockings.  At the end of 
World War I when shorter, knee-length skirts became the fashion, sheer rayon 
stockings sold for about a dollar a pair—in contrast to five dollars a pair for 
silk—earning rayon the moniker ―the middle-class woman‘s silk.‖ 62  A historian 
of rayon quipped that ―it was on the trim legs of the post-war flappers… that 
rayon first stepped out into big business.‖63  With business booming, American 
Viscose continued to expand, building six additional factories, each located on a 
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major river: Roanoke, Virginia (1916) on the Roanoke River; Lewistown, 
Pennsylvania (1920) on the Juniata River; Parkersburg, West Virginia (1926) on 
the Little Kanawha River; Meadville, Pennsylvania (1928) on French Creek (a 
major tributary of the Allegheny River); Nitro, West Virginia (1936) on the 
Kanawha River; and Front Royal, Virginia (1937) on the South Fork of the 
Shenandoah (see fig. 3). By the time the American Viscose plant opened in 
Front Royal, Courtaulds and American Viscose had succeeded in building a 
new industry with powerful technological momentum.  Although AVC lost its 
monopoly on the viscose rayon process in 1921 and had to compete with other 
manufacturers, the company remained the largest rayon producer in the U.S.  
 
Figure 4.  Locations of American Viscose plants along major river systems, circa 1937.  Source: 
Coleman, Volume II, Rayon, 290. 
 
      
 
Chapter 2 
World War II Production and Momentum 
 
By 1939, massive disruptions caused by war in Europe changed the field 
on which business and consumer transactions occurred.  For Courtaulds, this 
led to an event that ―marked the end of an era‖ in the history of the company.64  
Yet while Courtaulds‘ circumstances changed dramatically with the outbreak of 
World War II, the momentum of the rayon manufacturing technological system 
itself continued unscathed and, in fact, intensified.     
In wartime, boundaries between industry, politics, and national interests 
become increasingly fluid.  The mixture of Britain‘s dire need for military 
supplies, isolationist pressures in the United States, and American economic 
opportunism created a gap big enough for AVC to slip away from Courtaulds.  
The American Viscose Corporation‘s first major role on the global stage was not 
directly related to the products it manufactured, but to its status as a British-
owned corporation.  In March 1941, as Britain struggled with shortages of 
military supplies, the company stood suddenly center-stage in the political 
theater; with seven factories and eighteen thousand employees, American 
Viscose was Britain‘s most valuable industrial holding in the United States.65   
President Franklin D. Roosevelt‘s administration walked a fine line in the 
months leading up to March of 1941.  As other European nations fell rapidly 
                                                 
64
 D.C. Coleman, Courtaulds: An Economic and Social History, Volume I, The Nineteenth Century 
Silk and Crape  (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), ix.  
 
65
 ―American Viscose is Sold by Britain to Bankers Here,‖ New York Times (March 17, 1941): 1; 
Ron Chernow, The House of Morgan: An American Banking Dynasty and the Rise of Modern Finance 
(New York: Touchstone, 1991), 462. 
 
  
33 
under Nazi control, the United Kingdom fought for survival, financially 
strapped, and in dire need of supplies.  Many factors tempered Roosevelt‘s 
ability to provide material support to Britain.  The four Neutrality Acts, passed 
in the wake of World War I to keep the U.S. out of foreign conflicts, limited U.S. 
ability to declare war, make cash loans, or provide supplies to combatants on 
either side of a conflict.  With strong isolationist and anti-British sentiment in 
Congress and the nation, and the presidential election looming in November of 
1940, the Roosevelt administration used creative methods to aid the British.   
 For example, in 1940, Roosevelt declared large quantities of munitions 
―surplus‖ and shipped them off to England.  However, to retain good public 
opinion, the administration believed that it was critical for the U.S. receive 
something in return for military supplies sent to the U.K.  Britain purchased 
some materials under Roosevelt‘s ―cash and carry‖ policy that allowed sale of 
military goods to combatants but required them to pay for and transport the 
goods immediately.  In September of 1940, British Prime Minister Winston 
Churchill agreed to swap ninety-nine year leases on eight British colonial 
islands ―for the establishment of naval and air bases‖ in exchange for fifty 
―surplus‖ U.S. Navy destroyers.  Churchill‘s correspondence with Roosevelt, 
however, clearly demonstrates that the fifty destroyers were not nearly enough; 
the British need for military supplies remained dire.66 
Following his re-election in November, President Roosevelt began to 
aggressively pursue means to aid the U.K.  His friend and Treasury Secretary, 
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Henry Morgenthau, Jr., recorded in his voluminous diaries Roosevelt‘s 
explanation of his proposal:   
It seems to me that the thing to do is to get away from the dollar 
sign… I don‘t want to put the thing in terms of dollars or loans, 
and I think the thing to do is to say that we will manufacture 
what we need, …increase our productivity, and then we will say to 
England, we will give you the guns and ships that you need, 
provided that when the war is over you will return to us in kind 
the guns and the ships that we have loaned to you… 67    
 
This approach would not require repeal of the Neutrality Acts, since this was 
not a cash loan or an outright gift to Britain.  To the press, Roosevelt declared 
that Britain fighting Germany was analogous to a neighbor trying to put out a 
house fire.  Rather than demand payment in the midst of the crisis, ―certainly, 
he said, you would lend your garden hose to your neighbor and worry about 
repayment later.‖68   
The President continued to press forth aggressively and eloquently in 
support of this plan, delivering his famous ―arsenal of democracy‖ fireside chat 
on December 29, 1940.  The blistering speech hammered home the 
vulnerability of the U.S. to hostile powers and the critical role played by Britain 
as the ―spearhead of resistance to world conquest.‖  Roosevelt also called on 
industrialists and labor to increase military production to defend the U.S. and 
support the Allies: ―all our present efforts are not enough.  We must have more 
ships, more guns, more planes—more of everything.‖69   
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Behind the scenes, Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau, Jr. and his 
staff worked to put Roosevelt‘s ideas into legislative form, drafting the future 
Lend-Lease Act.  The bill gave the President broad powers to apportion supplies 
and decide which countries could receive defense resources.  It also left open 
the question of precisely how countries would repay the loans and leases at 
war‘s end.70  Morgenthau was deeply involved, not only in crafting of the bill, 
but also in the political maneuverings to get it passed in Congress.  As part of 
this effort, he pushed persistently for the British to demonstrate their 
commitment to reciprocity in lend-lease.   
Many in Congress and the American public were skeptical that Britain 
could not afford to purchase U.S. military supplies outright.  People theorized 
that England was secreting away billions in gold and other assets in their 
colonies around the world and trying to hoodwink the U.S. into ―financing 
Britain‘s war.‖71  Because of this concern, much of Morgenthau‘s Congressional 
testimony on the Lend-Lease Bill in January 1941 focused on demonstrating 
the financial need of the British Empire.  His tables of expenditures and 
receipts showed that ―British gold resources, holdings of American securities, 
and investments in the United States and elsewhere in the world, even if 
entirely liquidated, could not meet [Britain‘s] deficit.‖72   
Despite these numbers, the Roosevelt administration remained of the 
opinion that Britain should reassure Congress and the American public of its 
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financial need and commitment by selling off some of its assets in the United 
States.  Conversations between Secretary Morgenthau and his British 
counterpart on this subject had started as early as July of 1940.  Pressure on 
the British increased in December with the announcement of Lend-Lease.  As 
part of Morgenthau‘s Lend-Lease testimony in January 1941 before the House 
Foreign Affairs Committee, he conveyed the promise of a U.K. Treasury official 
that the British would sell some of their major assets in the United States ―as 
rapidly as possible.‖73   
Still the British stalled, scrambling to find other options rather than sell 
their American investments, which Churchill described as ―of a special 
character… the result of decades of healthy competitive effort.‖  As the U.S. 
Congressional debates on Lend-Lease continued into March of 1941, 
Morgenthau grew impatient with the British officials, stating that he had staked 
his reputation before Congress on what appeared to be a falsehood.  On March 
10th, the day before Roosevelt signed Lend-Lease into law, Morgenthau stopped 
by the home of Lord Halifax, the British ambassador to the U.S., to apply some 
personal pressure.  Morgenthau explained that the President would be 
requesting an appropriation to fund Lend-Lease in a few days and needed to see 
movement on the U.K.‘s promise in order to win Congressional support.  His 
message got through: around midnight on the 10th, British treasury officials 
exchanged a message ―to the effect that some very large company would have to 
be sold very quickly.‖74 
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President Roosevelt signed the Lend-Lease Act on Tuesday, March 11th, 
1941 and immediately requested a 7 billion dollar appropriation from Congress 
to fund the program.75  With Roosevelt‘s backing, Morgenthau set a deadline for 
the British to complete a sale: March 15th, the following Saturday.  American 
Viscose, Britain‘s largest and most valuable industrial holding in the U.S., was 
selected.76  Using wartime powers, the U.K. Treasury took over AVC‘s assets 
and approached potential outright buyers, including Du Pont, another major 
rayon manufacturer.  Anti-trust laws prevented them from acquiring American 
Viscose, and no other single buyer emerged.  The British officials then went to 
Morgan Stanley & Co. and Dillon, Read & Co., banking firms with whom the 
British had an existing relationship, to arrange a sale to a syndicate of 
American bankers.77  British officials signed the sale agreement on Sunday, 
March 16th; the Senate approved the Lend-Lease appropriation on March 24th. 
As it turned out, American Viscose was the only major British asset sold 
to U.S. interests; in future transactions, Britain was able to obtain loans using 
their American holdings as collateral.  Unfortunately, due to the unusual 
circumstances of the sale, Britain received far less for American Viscose than 
the estimated value of the company.  Although valued at over $100 million, the 
bankers paid less than $63 million and took such a hefty percentage for 
commissions and expenses that the British Treasury received less than $55 
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million.78  This remained a sore point with Courtaulds, as well as Churchill, 
who thought the U.K. had been ―fleeced by the bankers.‖79  It is interesting to 
consider that many of the military supplies reaching the U.K. through Lend-
Lease in years to come would contain rayon materials from AVC factories.  
Courtaulds was able to continue rayon production in the U.K. for most of the 
war years but may not have been able to meet the massive increase in demand 
for certain rayon products.  Perhaps it was fortunate that American Viscose, 
whose product would become so critical to the Allied powers, was the one major 
British asset sold to the U.S.  Through the War Production Board (WPB) and 
other government agencies, the government could direct production priorities 
and raw materials to manufacture an adequate supply. 
Events in the Pacific quickly made clear the importance of American 
Viscose‘s chemical yarns.  Only five pages into his Arsenal of Democracy: The 
Story of the War Production Board, Donald M. Nelson, the first chairman of the 
WPB, began to write about rubber.  It was January 1942; the United States was 
newly at war with Japan, Italy, and Germany.  Nelson wrote that the Japanese 
―were cutting through the jungles down the Malay Peninsula, engulfing the 
plantations where the bulk of the world‘s raw rubber was produced… Soon no 
more cargoes of irreplaceable raw materials would be leaving those islands for 
North America.  We were really in trouble.‖80  Despite the recent expansions in 
U.S. production of military equipment for national defense and supplying Allied 
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countries, America in 1942 faced significant deficiencies in military and 
material strength.  President Roosevelt‘s administration and military officials 
knew they would be required to fight a ―total war‖ against the Axis nations, one 
in which mobility—in trucks, tanks, planes, etc.—was critical.81   
In Front Royal, Virginia, the new American Viscose Corporation facility 
had been in operation for one year.  In short order, it would become the largest 
U.S. producer of war-critical high tenacity rayon cord for use in tires, helping 
stave off a rubber-shortage crisis, and ensure Allied military agility.  The uses of 
rayon and the field of rayon producers diversified by the start of World War II; 
the major U.S. manufacturers were American Viscose, DuPont, Industrial 
Rayon, American Enka, and North American Rayon.82  All of them employed 
scientists to research new rayon product possibilities.  One of their goals was to 
produce rayon with a higher tensile strength, meaning it could bear greater 
longitudinal stress than normal rayon before tearing.  Such a discovery could 
open a broad range of industrial uses for rayon.   
By the early 1930s, Du Pont was producing a stronger yarn, spurring 
Courtaulds scientists to develop a better method.  By 1935, Courtaulds 
patented a process for even higher tenacity cord.  The key components were a 
different mix of salts in the acid spinning bath and a mechanism that 
simultaneously stretched the yarn while applying heat.83  The added pressure 
―arranges the long-chain molecules into parallel lines.‖  Since the groups of 
molecules are in parallel position and thus must be ―broken as bundles,‖ high 
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tenacity rayon can withstand much greater force without breaking.84  
Courtaulds started making this rayon for use in tire cord in 1939 at their 
Coventry plant in England.  The American Viscose plant in Front Royal, still 
under Courtaulds ownership when it opened in 1940, manufactured rayon tire 
cord from the beginning.85   
Tire cord plays an extremely important role in determine performance of 
pneumatic tires.  Cords ―give the tire its shape, size stability, load-carrying 
capacity, fatigue, and bruise resistance.‖86  Prior to the creation of high tenacity 
rayon, tire manufacturers used cotton tire cord for this purpose.  When World 
War II broke out, there was little data regarding the relative merits of rayon tire 
cord over cotton, although preliminary tests suggested that rayon was stronger 
and ran cooler than cotton.87  After Japanese movements in the Pacific cut off 
natural rubber supplies, however, scientists engaged in developing synthetic 
rubber found that tires made from that substance worked best in combination 
with rayon tire cord.  Thus, global circumstances suddenly made high tenacity 
rayon tire cord one of the war‘s most important resources.  Although its 
American Viscose holdings were soon to disappear from their portfolio, 
―Courtaulds had made a breakthrough [with their 1935 patent] just in time.‖88   
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With the marriage of rayon tire cord to synthetic rubber during World 
War II, the technological momentum of viscose rayon, its manufacturing 
process, and the corporate producers increased exponentially.  At Front Royal, 
the direct connections between the AVC plant and Allied military efforts had 
specific long-term impacts.  The military need, combined with the social values, 
aspirations, and fears of the war years, locked in a pattern of production and a 
relationship with the South Fork of the Shenandoah that changed very little 
over the remainder of the plant‘s operating life.89   
 During World War II, the organizational might of the War Production 
Board became a driving component of rayon‘s technological system, particularly 
at American Viscose‘s Front Royal plant.  In January 1942, just over a month 
after the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt 
summoned Donald Nelson to a meeting.  Nelson listened in awe as the 
President ―named the coefficients of the unheard-of volume of production which 
would be necessary to supply the European and the Asiatic theaters of war‖ and 
the problems to date with organizing war production.  Roosevelt selected Nelson 
to head up a new entity—the War Production Board—to coordinate a massive 
expansion of manufacturing.  The WPB as presented to Nelson had a 
remarkable scope of responsibilities and powers:  
to co-ordinate the whole production program; organize, for 
production, American industry of all sizes and shapes; referee the 
claims of the Army, the Navy, and the Maritime Commission and 
get them sources of supply; apportion materials and the use of 
facilities among claimants—and yet keep our Armed Forces 
backed up by a stable civilian economy.90 
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Within the WPB framework, different offices, divisions, and directors 
focused on production and conservation of multiple types of resources, 
including rubber, textiles, chemicals, and rayon.  For example, there was an 
Office of Rubber, a Tire Cord Branch, a Textile, Clothing and Leather Bureau 
that included a Synthetic Textiles Division, and so on.91  It was an enormously 
intricate government apparatus, charged with a mammoth task.  Observing just 
a minute corner of this—the production of rayon for military use—reveals 
complexities, frustrations, and sobering realities that such a dramatic shift in 
industrial production required. 
America‘s reliance on imported rubber emerged as one of the great 
material challenges of the war.  By 1940, the U.S. transportation system was 
largely motorized and thus reliant on rubber for tires.  By the time of Pearl 
Harbor, the nation had built a rubber reserve approximately equal to one year‘s 
peacetime usage.92  The WPB‘s Donald Nelson wrote of the failure to stockpile 
more rubber during 1940 with frustration: ―We had the money and we knew 
where to get the stuff.  Why we didn‘t exchange the money, of which we had 
plenty, for war goods or raw materials, I don‘t know exactly.‖93 
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First with Lend-Lease and then as the U.S. entered the war, the urgent 
need for rubber for tire production became increasingly clear.  Historian 
Michael Edelstein wrote that this necessity for rubber and other resources grew 
from the U.S. decision to fight a ―capital intensive war,‖ relying heavily on 
equipment like tanks and planes.  This was in part an effort to avoid the 
heinous trench warfare of World War I, but the U.S. also faced a German army 
that had successfully used tank and air offenses against Poland, France, and 
Russia.94  Meeting this fast-moving enemy compelled the U.S. to rapidly create 
mobile, military machinery in quantity, and that required rubber tires for 
trucks, tanks, planes and numerous others military resources.   
The nascent production of synthetic rubber as of 1941 was nowhere near 
adequate to meet wartime demand.  Soon after Pearl Harbor, Nelson reported to 
Roosevelt and Churchill that the U.S. had inadequate supplies of natural 
rubber and no synthetic rubber facilities, only ―a rather promising technique for 
the manufacture of synthetic rubber…‖  He wrote, ―I think we are going to be in 
terrible straits… The United States travels on rubber, and our army is helpless 
without it.  We even use tremendous quantities in building warships and 
airplanes.‖95  In order to buy time to develop synthetic rubber manufacturing, 
the War Production Board placed limits on civilian use of rubber, rationing 
tires, tubes, and gasoline, lowering the speed limit, and prioritizing 
allocations.96 
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 As efforts to put synthetic rubber into production intensified, high 
tenacity rayon cord became increasingly important.  Military and civilian tests 
undertaken in the early years of the war indicated that cotton cord was 
―probably unsatisfactory‖ for use with synthetic rubber.  The Army and Navy 
Munitions Board requested a priority designation for rayon tire cord in the 
spring of 1942.  A May 3rd confidential report named high-tenacity viscose 
rayon as the military‘s preferred choice for tire cord due to its strength, 
resistance to high temperature, greater mileage, and use of ―less strategic raw 
materials than the other types.‖  While stating that, ―no substitutes are 
available for rayon,‖ the report also identified the major drawback of high 
tenacity rayon: like natural rubber and synthetic rubber, it too was in short 
supply.  ―Motor transport alone could consume about three times the entire 
proposed production of 1943.‖97  In September 1942, the War Production Board 
signaled its concurrence and gave rayon tire cord an Urgency rating.98 
The designation granted the WPB power to require rayon manufacturers 
to produce high tenacity cord and to dictate quantities.  The WPB worked with 
companies to supply machinery and raw materials, locate adequate labor, and 
expand facilities.  The five rayon-manufacturing companies in the U.S.—
American Viscose, DuPont, Industrial Rayon, American Enka, and North 
American Rayon—expressed willingness to participate and submitted plans to 
shift production from rayon for consumer use to high tenacity rayon.  Only 
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American Viscose tried to stipulate conditions for increasing their supply of 
high tenacity rayon, requesting that the government ―assure a market for the 
yarn ‗for a long enough time to justify conversion and the investment 
involved‘… and ‗grant a price increase sufficient to reimburse the corporation 
for its loses resulting from conversion.‘‖99 
 Quantities of synthetic rubber manufactured in the U.S. jumped over the 
course of the war, from 28 million tons in 1942 to nearly 922 million tons in 
1945.100  Rayon producers and the War Production Board had to scramble to 
keep up.  Internal WPB documents demonstrate the challenges inherent in this 
process.  For the first two years, rayon production always lagged behind 
projected military needs, as expansion at the factories took longer than 
expected.  In March of 1943, new tire tests found that rayon cord was 
absolutely essential for larger sizes of synthetic rubber tires.  Other tire cord 
materials, such as cotton, could not adequately support the weight of large 
tanks and trucks.  Projected requirements for high tenacity rayon cord for the 
remainder of 1943 and 1944 grew dramatically.  Requirements for 1944 more 
than doubled.101   
 Demand increased further as military supply units adjusted their 
requests for tire cord to fit emerging needs.  In early 1944, Donald Nelson at the 
WPB broke the news that a new manufacturer of synthetic rubber would 
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increase production considerably, so that supplies of synthetic rubber 
threatened to ―exceed the corresponding supply of tire cord.‖  Rayon mills were 
already strained, needing to produce enough material for both military use and 
―essential civilian requirements.‖102  The military demand strained supplies for 
―vital and indispensible civilian activities as transportation and farming.‖103  To 
meet these demands, the WPB had no option but to shift materials and labor to 
support rayon cord manufacturing.    
Certain requirements for production of high tenacity rayon compounded 
the challenge of manufacturing adequate supplies.  For one, processing the 
material required sufficient quantities of chemicals.  By 1942, the War 
Production Board controlled all allocations of sulfuric acid, one of the main 
chemicals involved in rayon production.104  The agency covered all costs for 
General Chemical Company to build and operate a new factory adjacent to 
American Viscose.  An elevated pipeline crossed the fence between the 
properties and pumped sulfuric acid directly into the rayon plant.105  Early in 
the war, the WPB also designated Stauffer Chemical Company to build a factory 
near Front Royal to produce 26.4 million pounds of carbon disulfide annually.  
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The plant‘s ―entire output was to be consumed by the [American Viscose] 
Facility.‖106 
 The WPB sought to keep their investments safe, highlighting again the 
critical value of high tenacity rayon to the military.  As the war went on, 
security guards were organized and enrolled into a civilian auxiliary to the 
Army‘s Military Police.  The Brigadier General in charge of the military police 
spoke to the Guard about preventing ―espionage, sabotage and other 
threats.‖107  Herman F. Stuhr, a manager at the rayon plant from 1940-1976, 
described his realization of the true military importance of high tenacity rayon 
when the guards at the plant began to wear guns.108 
The military need was such that the WPB even converted some 
munitions factories over to manufacturing machinery for rayon production.  
The machines used to make rayon yarns for fabrics and other civilian goods 
could not produce high tenacity rayon tire cord.  Facilities needed specialized 
equipment to stretch, spin, and twist rayon yarn into cord.  This was one of the 
disadvantages of rayon over cotton: ―the twisting and weaving of rayon cord 
require[d] considerably more facilities than for an equal poundage of cotton.‖109  
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Unfortunately, the existing facility at Front Royal did not have adequate space 
to accommodate the new spinning machines and other necessary equipment.   
Despite the setbacks, the American Viscose plant at Front Royal grew to 
be the largest producer of high tenacity rayon in the U.S., increasing its 
capacity from 25 million pounds to 82 million pounds annually,110 and 
manufacturing roughly a third of total U.S. output.  Expansion of the plant to 
accommodate this production proceeded with a variety of twists and turns.  A 
shortage of labor ranked among the most difficult challenge for the WPB.  
Stonewalling by both the War Manpower Commission and the Virginia Draft 
Board delayed WPB requests for draft deferments for textile workers.  
Bureaucratic wrangling also slowed the transfer of additional workers from 
other industries to the Front Royal facility by several months.  J. Spencer Love, 
Director of the Textile, Clothing and Leather Bureau of the WPB, fumed that if 
the requested employees had been made available to all U.S. rayon producers, 
―hours of operation would have been brought to 144 per week with a resultant 
increase in production of 16,500,000 pounds of cord per half year.‖111  Industry 
wide, the estimated shortage of manpower in early 1944 was 2,500 people or 
6%.  According to Love, this was ―the main problem confronting the industry.‖  
New cord twisting machines arrived at the rayon plants with no one to run 
them.112 
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These challenges manifested in a variety of ways at the American Viscose 
plant in Front Royal.  At its peak, the plant employed a combined total of nearly 
4,000 people either working inside the plant making rayon or doing 
construction to expand the facility.  Labor shortages due to military enlistments 
and the draft required plant managers to scour the countryside in search of 
workers.  In order to conserve tires and supply as much local labor as possible, 
the WPB sponsored buses to crisscross the Shenandoah Valley picking up 
workers for the various shifts at the plant.  Workers transferred from out-of-
town by the War Manpower Commission in Front Royal only to find a severe 
housing shortage in the community.  The WPB faced additional bureaucratic 
struggles, this time with the National Housing Agency, to gain authorization to 
construct new housing, which in turn required additional labor to complete.   
Difficulties at the top sifted down into dissatisfaction among workers.  By 
coincidence, a special tire cord meeting, called by WPB chief Donald Nelson in 
March of 1944, occurred the same morning that employees of Rust Engineering 
at the plant in Front Royal went on strike.  Most of the workers were imported 
construction labor working on the many expansions to the plant.  Housing 
shortages led to the strike; the community needed about 400 trailers, as well as 
barracks and houses, to accommodate both the construction labor and the ―in-
migrants‖ supplying the mill with new operating personnel.  The meeting 
minutes blame the War Manpower Commission for the delay and reflect the 
selection of a special representative to ensure delivery of the trailers. The 
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meeting minutes also note with alarm that the strike could further destabilize 
efforts to meet rayon objectives for the year.113    
In response to such events, Nelson‘s staff encouraged him to take steps 
to improve morale at facilities like Front Royal.  They note questions among 
men in the mills about ―whether the government was really serious in their 
desire for increased production.‖ 114  Long hours and challenging working 
conditions increased the workers‘ frustrations with the company.  The WPB 
attempted to pressure the U.S. rayon plants to run mills seven days a week.  
Some met the requirement; others could not convince ―their labor to operate at 
all on Sunday.‖115   
These challenges were never completely remedied, but the WPB and 
American Viscose made an effort to reward employees and emphasize the 
importance of their work for the national cause.  Nelson visited factories and 
met in-person with producers.  He specifically recommended that 
manufacturers show their workers a certain motion picture that demonstrated 
vividly ―the urgency of the entire war program and the need for its full 
support.‖116  Actress Greer Garson visited Front Royal and gave a talk at 
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American Viscose emphasizing the importance of increased production for the 
war effort.117  Toward the end of the war, the WPB organized a rally at the Front 
Royal plant to award to the facility ―the E for Excellence that the War 
Production Board awarded for excellence in War Production.‖118  In addition, 
AVC organized ―family nights‖ at the plant featuring shows, food, and games 
with prizes for children (see fig. 5).  Avisco News, a company publication, 
included employee appreciations, as well as news and letters home from AVC 
workers in military service overseas.119 
 
Figure 5. Family night at the AVC plant, 1943.  Courtesy of Warren Heritage Society. 
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In addition to labor problems and friction from other government 
agencies, challenges to rayon production sometimes came from within the War 
Production Board.  In October of 1944, the WPB Operations Office—without the 
knowledge of the WPB‘s Tire Cord Branch—removed high tenacity rayon yarn 
from the Production Urgency List.  Inclusion on the list meant that plants 
received priority in the apportionment of labor and construction of facilities.120  
The director of the Textile, Clothing and Leather Bureau, J. Spencer Love, 
expressed grave concern to the Operations Vice Chair, and requested that ―high 
tenacity rayon construction and production‖ be reinstated on the list.  Love 
explained that the Rubber Bureau continued to increase its requirements for 
the rayon cord, while yarn production lagged behind forecasts.  Most of the 
delay, Love wrote, stemmed from ―labor shortages or work stoppages of one sort 
or another.‖  The continued protection of the Urgency List was crucial, 
―particularly at Front Royal, VA‖ and two other facilities.  Love closed his memo 
with a plea: after suffering from chronic labor shortages for a year and a half, 
reducing the urgency status of rayon tire cord would be demoralizing for the 
mill workers, ―just at a time when they are beginning to climb the hill toward 
full utilization of their facilities.‖121 
Throughout World War II, American Viscose at Front Royal faced 
constant challenges, proceeding by a multilinear path, rife with trail and error.  
In January of 1945, expansion at the facility still lagged months behind 
                                                 
120
 United States Civilian Production Administration, 840. 
 
121
 ―Memorandum: J. Spencer Love to Hiland G. Batcheller. Subject: Production Urgency List, 
October 21, 1944,‖ 1; Rayon Cord, High Tenacity, Program 1944-1945; WPB: Rayon; Records of the 
WPB, RG 179; NACP. 
 
  
53 
schedule.  A thirty-three page memo on the ―Development of War Production 
Board Tire Cord Program‖ outlined reasons for the hold-up: 
While the principal difficulty in connection with this project 
appears to have been the shortage of labor as such, some 
contributing factors are suggested by the following statement 
contained in the May 15, 1944 Monthly Progress Report of the Tire 
Cord Branch: ―The project at Front Royal has suffered from lack of 
coordination of the efforts of scores of individually competent 
people, representing the government and the company, to do 
something about labor, housing, community services, and a 
multitude of related matters.‖122 
 
The WPB thus summarized the difficulties and failings during World War II at 
the American Viscose plant in Front Royal.  One issue, however, that proved to 
have lasting and devastating repercussions, remained unmentioned in any 
existing War Production Board documents: the disposal of huge quantities of 
chemical byproducts from manufacturing high tenacity rayon.123  The priorities 
and urgency of the war sidelined any concerns about waste disposal or 
protection for the Shenandoah River.   
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Chapter 3 
Manufacturing Rayon, Manufacturing Toxic Waste 
 
 World War II added a tremendous amount of technological momentum to 
the rayon plant at Front Royal.  At the same time, however, the massive 
increase in production destabilized the plant‘s relationship to the South Fork of 
the Shenandoah.  American Viscose‘s dependence on the river grew more than 
threefold since the start of the war.  With an output, by 1945, of 82 million 
pounds of high tenacity rayon cord per year, the plant used at least 41 million 
gallons of water every day, and probably a good deal more.124  The river helped 
to win World War II.  Unfortunately, the massive increase in rayon production 
created a flood of chemical wastes needing treatment and disposal.  
Technologies for treating chemical waste in the 1940s were inadequate to 
begin with.  The wastewater treatment facility at American Viscose was engulfed 
and overwhelmed, an example of how the managers of rayon‘s technological 
system interacted with the river ―without fully understanding what they [had] 
created‖ and what rayon waste could do.125  By 1945, the river was a casualty of 
war.  From the American Viscose outflow pipe to the confluence with the 
Potomac at Harper‘s Ferry, the Shenandoah was essentially dead.  The chemical 
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wastes entering the river had ―almost eliminated aquatic life in the Shenandoah 
River for a 50-mile stretch.‖126   
The chemicals that devastated the river came from each stage of the 
viscose rayon manufacturing process.  Each step in the transformation of wood 
cellulose into rayon yarn involved some sort of chemical; none of them were 
healthy for the South Fork.  Viscose rayon begins with tree pulp.  American 
Viscose sourced most of its pulp from softwood trees such as spruce and 
hemlock grown in Alaska, Canada, and the Pacific Northwest.  Chipping, 
pulping and pressing the trees occurred off-site, so that the cellulose arrived by 
boxcar at the Front Royal site as white sheets, said to resemble blotting paper 
(see fig. 6).127   
Sodium hydroxide, frequently referred to as caustic soda or lye, was the 
first chemical used on-site in the rayon process.  The cellulose sheets soaked in 
large tanks full of caustic soda diluted with water; this expanded the fiber, 
leading to a thicker viscose solution.128  The sheets were mechanically pressed 
to remove excess liquid, then crumbled and shredded into a material termed 
―white crumb‖ (see figs. 7-9).  The crumbs had to age for two or three days in 
carefully controlled conditions in order to correctly oxidize the material.  Carbon 
disulfide (CS2) in gas form was the next chemical involved in the process.  
Churning the aged white crumb with carbon disulfide created a cellulose 
xanthate, yellowish in color, and thus referred to as ―yellow crumb.‖  This 
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material, when mixed again with dilute caustic soda, dissolved into a viscose: a 
thick, honey colored, cellulose xanthate suspension.   
Viscose ―ripened‖ for four or five days in climate-controlled viscose 
cellars.  Part of the xanthation reaction (the chemical reaction of carbon 
disulfide with cellulose) reversed at this time, leaving a material that 
regenerated more easily to cellulose in the next phase of production.  The 
reversible reaction also freed CS2 gases from the viscose into the air.  The 
viscose next underwent filtering and degassing; if it met specifications, the 
material was pumped to the Production Department.   
The next phase of the process regenerated the cellulosic fibers in the 
viscose into continuous filaments.  Pumps forced the viscose through platinum 
spinnerets, devices resembling very small shower heads, each punctured with 
hundreds of small holes.  The resulting fibers immediately entered an acid 
spinning bath that solidified the cellulose into continuous rayon fibers.  The 
spinning bath comprised a mix of chemicals; the composition varied for 
different types of rayon, but in general, the bath contained sulfuric acid, 
sodium sulfate, zinc sulfate, and glucose.129  Again, amounts varied depending 
on the type of rayon, but in general, making one pound of rayon required 
approximately one pound of wood pulp, ―1.8 pounds of sulfuric acid, 1.4 
pounds of sodium hydroxide, 0.5 pounds of glucose, 0.4 pounds of carbon 
disulfide, 0.4 pounds of other chemicals,‖ as well as caustic soda, and at least 
175 gallons of water.130   
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As they emerged from the acid baths, the rayon threads wound through 
several wheels and spun into a revolving box (see figs. 10-11).  The process, 
called box spinning, stretched the threads, causing the cellulose chains to line 
up in approximately parallel lines and giving the rayon threads greater 
strength.  Higher levels of tenacity required more extensive stretching later in 
the process and thus additional equipment (see figs. 12-13).  When the box 
filled up, the spinning machine had to be shut down to remove the spun yarn, 
now referred to as a ―cake.‖  Special cabinets stored the cakes for a short time 
to allow further venting of carbon disulfide.  Next the Cake Wash Department 
sent the material through a huge machine that washed, bleached, and dried the 
cakes of rayon yarn (see figs. 15-16).131  Creation of the major chemical wastes 
essentially stopped at this point in the procedure; remaining steps involved 
twisting the yarn and preparing it for shipping.  While the plant was in 
operation, this process from steeping cellulose to shipping finished rayon yarn 
was continuous.  Thousands of gallons of viscose moved through the plant 
every hour.132 
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Figures 6-19.  Rayon production procedure at the American Viscose plant in 
Front Royal, early 1940s.     
 
 
Figure 6.  Cellulose sheets in storage, 1941.   Courtesy of WHS. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.  Loading cellulose sheets for steeping in sodium hydroxide, 1941.  Courtesy of WHS. 
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Figure 8.  Pressing cellulose sheets after steeping in sodium hydroxide, 1941.  Courtesy of WHS. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.  White Crumb, 1941.  Courtesy of WHS. 
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Figure 10.  Spinning machines.  Courtesy of WHS.  Note: It is unclear whether this photo shows 
machines used to spin high tenacity rayon yarns for tire cord or a lower tenacity fiber.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11.  Detail of spinning machines.  Courtesy of WHS. 
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Figure 12.  Stretching and winding rayon yarn to make high tenacity cord.  Courtesy of WHS. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13.  Close up of stretching machine and worker, 1943.  Courtesy of WHS. 
  
62 
 
Figure 14.  Loading cakes of rayon into cake wash machine, 1941.  Courtesy of WHS. 
 
 
 
Figure 15.  Detail of cake wash machine, 1941.  Courtesy of WHS. 
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The continuous rayon manufacturing process required a tremendous 
amount of electricity.  While the plant was under construction in 1938, Front 
Royal‘s Town Manager noted, ―they will use about 80 times as much electricity 
out there as we use in the whole town.‖133  To meet this need, the facility built 
its own coal-burning power plant with six boilers on-site.  Train cars delivered 
coal directly to the plant from the Norfolk and Western tracks that bisected the 
property.  In the 1980s, estimates showed that the plant used roughly 1,000 
tons of coal a day; it would likely have used much larger amounts in previous 
decades when production levels were higher.  Many other materials for the 
facility also arrived by rail: tank cars with chemicals and fuel oil, box cars of 
pulp sheets, lumber, machinery, and rock salt for softening water.134 
The  technological system of the rayon plant required inputs of these 
multiple materials and produced a range of toxic outputs, all of which had an 
eventual harmful impact on the health of the South Fork of the Shenandoah 
River.  All told, the rayon facility produced three main hazardous waste 
streams: fly ash from burning coal in the power plant; alkaline wastes, 
especially off-specification sodium cellulose xanthate-based viscose, commonly 
referred to as ―waste viscose;‖ and liquid acid wastes with zinc-hydroxide and 
other salts from the acid bath process.135  The Avtex facility made several types 
of viscose rayon yarn over the course of its operating life, each requiring 
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variation on this basic manufacturing procedure.  However, the processes were 
similar enough that the waste streams and avenues by which the chemicals 
migrated into the environment were essentially the same.   
Carbon disulfide entered the environment as a liquid, gas, or component 
of waste viscose.  Since the reaction of CS2 with the cellulose in ―white crumb‖ 
was reversible, the chemical constantly released from the resulting viscose 
substance into the surrounding environment.  Thus, during every stage of the 
process after xanthation occurs—the ripening, spinning, venting, and washing 
processes—carbon disulfide returned to its original chemical composition and 
―escaped‖ into the air, the acid spinning bath, or the cake wash water.  The 
factory vented airborne CS2 through its smokestack.  At present, viscose rayon 
factories remain the primary source of carbon disulfide in the atmosphere and 
the environment in general.  In modern day rayon plants, ventilation into the 
atmosphere can total anywhere between 15 and 40 tons per day.136  For years, 
residents of the Front Royal community ruefully joked that the rotten-egg 
stench of carbon disulfide ―smelled like money.‖137   
The financial benefit of the rayon plant came with a high cost, both to 
human health and to riverine life in the South Fork.  Excessive exposure to 
carbon disulfide has dramatic health effects in humans and other mammals, 
including nerve, vascular, and ophthalmologic damage, as well as psychological 
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disturbances.138  Safety reports compiled by the union at American Viscose in 
1946, before protective eyewear became mandatory, described employees 
suffering from an undisclosed set of symptoms termed ―fume eyes.‖139  Aquatic 
species in the South Fork of the Shenandoah River also demonstrated adverse 
reactions.  The most impacted were at the bottom of the food chain: aquatic 
invertebrates experienced reduced hatching and development defects; frogs and 
small fish showed deformities, and growth of algae was inhibited.140  Carbon 
disulfide could also contaminate the environment when waste viscose was 
disposed of improperly.  As the viscose continued to age, carbon disulfide 
continued to release into whatever medium was available.  If left exposed, 
rainwater could percolate through the waste viscose, capture CS2 and carry it 
into groundwater, streams, or into the river.  
Alkaline wastes from American Viscose also contaminated the South 
Fork.  The equipment at the factory reclaimed much of the caustic soda used in 
the steeping presses; however, some cellulosic material remained mixed in the 
caustic soda after the pressing process.  The reclaim system separated the two, 
leaving a material called ―heavy cellulose.‖  Standard operating procedures in 
the early 1940s called for the substance to be discarded into a chemical sewer; 
it is unclear whether this sewer drained directly to the river in the early ‗40s.  
Heavy cellulose in an aquatic environment could be dangerous.  The material 
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had a high biochemical oxygen demand (BOD).  Herman Stuhr, a chemical 
engineer and manager at the plant from 1940-1976, explained that BOD ―is a 
very common problem with almost anything that gets in a river.  It tends to 
reduce the available oxygen for fish or anything else that lives in the river.‖  In 
addition, despite the reclaim system, some caustic soda still left the plant either 
with the heavy cellulose, in the cake wash water, or in the form of waste 
viscose.  If improperly aged, the alkaline ―white crumb‖ material could become 
unusable and join the waste stream.141  At certain concentrations, caustic 
soda—aka sodium hydroxide—is extremely corrosive, dangerous to human and 
environmental health.  It can raise the pH of aquatic environments and is 
extremely toxic for fish and aquatic plants.142   
Acid and zinc wastes from the spinning baths comprised the third major 
waste stream from the rayon plant at Front Royal.  Although a reclaim system 
allowed reuse of much of the acid bath, a significant quantity still left the plant.  
In fact, wastewater treatment efforts in the early 1940s targeted sulfuric acid.  
The water used to wash rayon yarn was the main carrier, although accidents 
and overflow from other parts of the process caused occasional blasts of acid 
into the treatment system.  Sulfuric acid is also a highly corrosive substance, 
but unlike caustic soda, it drops the pH level in aquatic ecosystems.  Sulfuric 
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acid in high enough concentrations can wipe out a wide range of aquatic life, 
from macroinvertebrates, to shellfish, fish, and aquatic plants.143 
Courtaulds‘ chemists discovered that zinc sulphate was an important 
addition to the sulfuric acid bath used to solidify rayon fibers.  As Herman 
Stuhr noted, ―anything that had the slightest trace of spin bath in it had zinc in 
it.‖  Zinc, then, left the plant via the same paths as sulfuric acid, the cake wash 
water and any accidental acid overflows.  Manufacturing high tenacity rayon 
required a higher concentration of zinc in the acid bath—5% for high tenacity 
versus 1% for textile yarns.  High tenacity rayon also required more washing, 
resulting in increased waste water.144  Zinc compounds joined the list of wastes 
from the rayon plant that, at sufficient concentration, are ―extremely toxic to 
aquatic life.‖  Zinc wastes posed an additional challenge since conventional 
wastewater treatment facilities cannot adequately treat the material; it must be 
precipitated out of the waste stream.  Properly done, zinc can be reclaimed and 
reused.  However, only in the 1970s did the plant‘s waste treatment system 
include that procedure. 
Even under peace time operating conditions, manufacturing rayon was a 
messy and inefficient process.  All of the possible ways to create waste became 
more likely and frequent during the World War II years, due to the huge 
increase in production, the requirements of high tenacity rayon, and the 
shortage of well-qualified labor.  The urgent need for tire cord pushed the limits 
of the rayon technological system.  In the rush for production, the plant‘s 
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emergency release value was to purge masses of polluting material.  The river 
became the overflow receptacle for all the weaknesses in the system; any 
production problems flowed downstream into the South Fork.      
As a rule, manufacturing high tenacity rayon created more polluting 
waste than regular textile rayon yarns.  The spinning process required greater 
quantities and concentrations of sulfuric acid and zinc, and the sharp increase 
in production during the war necessitated greater quantities of all chemicals.  
In addition, every element of high tenacity rayon had to meet stricter, more 
stringent, specifications.  Stuhr explained that the disparity in quality control 
occurred because tire cord had to stand up to much more rigorous conditions 
than, for example, a shirt made of rayon fabric.  Thus every element of the 
process must be precisely controlled: ―when you make high tenacity rayon, 
you‘re pretty close to the ragged edge of making it all the time simply because 
you‘re asking the yarn to assume properties that it can only assume if 
everything is perfect… Any little catastrophe… can interfere with this 
operation.‖  To obtain such high standards, any materials that did not meet 
specifications had to be discarded.  In particular, off-spec or scrap viscose could 
not make ―first class tire yarn;‖ the material could not be reclaimed and was 
unusable for any other purpose.145     
Unfortunately, many aspects of the manufacturing process for high 
tenacity rayon exacerbated the inefficiencies within the regular rayon system.  A 
staff engineer at the facility noted that, throughout its operating life, any time 
                                                 
145
 ―Testimony of Herman F. Stuhr,‖ 69-70, 54. 
 
  
69 
the plant was in operation, viscose waste was constantly created.146  Under 
normal circumstances, any of a number of events could make viscose unusable.  
CS2 is highly explosive, and churns occasionally blew up, scorching the viscose. 
Workers might mix an incorrect ratio of ―white crumb‖ to carbon disulfide.  
Most frequently, viscose had to be thrown out because it had aged too long.  
Since CS2 begins to escape from viscose as soon as it is mixed, the aging 
process must be carefully timed.  Stuhr explains that ―aging doesn‘t stop no 
matter where the viscose is, whether it‘s in the pipes or whether it‘s out in the 
truck somewhere.‖147  Once ripened viscose reaches the proper composition, it 
must be spun within a precise timeframe.  For high tenacity rayon, the margin 
of error was extremely slim.  
The mechanical procedures used within rayon‘s technological system 
required a certain amount of waste.  Even in an ideal manufacturing scenario 
in which every element of the facility‘s technology functioned continuously, 
waste was inevitable.  The balance of chemicals, timing, and mechanical design 
was simply too fragile.  Some batches of viscose would always go bad from 
being aged improperly or acquiring impurities.  Viscose filters would inevitably 
clog, backing up aging viscose in the lines.  The spinning machines caused 
another kink in the system.  Anytime the machines turned off, viscose aged in 
the pump lines and had to be flushed out to join the facility‘s waste stream.  
Even without motor failure or other mechanical problems, shut down had to 
occur a few times per shift in order to remove finished cakes of yarn.   
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In general, problems with machinery occurred more frequently with high 
tenacity rayon.  As a thicker thread, high tenacity rayon cakes filled the 
spinning boxes more quickly and had to be removed five to ten times more 
often.  The frequent shut downs led to frequent motor burn out, further 
heightening waste production.  In addition, high tenacity rayon required a 
higher viscosity thicker viscose mix, clogging filters more quickly.  To produce 
high tenacity rayon, all spinning machines were upgraded at the outset of the 
war.  Shutting down each machine for several days to make the upgrades 
greatly increased the quantity of off-spec material.148  Richard Almy, the plant 
engineer at AVC, noted that two major power outages occurred during the 
course of the war—one caused by a flood, another by a fire.  Both times, all the 
viscose in the plant had to be scrapped.149 
 Deployment of hundreds of American Viscose employees overseas further 
multiplied the waste problem at the factory.  Although the War Production 
Board did procure draft deferments for some workers, labor shortages were a 
constant problem at the Front Royal facility.  Employees were needed not just to 
replace those serving in the military but also to staff the new machines for 
increased production.  In the face of greatly increased production requirements, 
management sought employees all across the region, running buses in shifts to 
pick up workers.  In the words of a union official at Local 371, they would hire 
―anyone who was warm.‖150   
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Higher numbers of workers under any conditions meant an increased 
opportunity for human error, but drastic recruitment measures at American 
Viscose resulted in an under-trained and sometimes unreliable workforce.  With 
almost the entire plant‘s production shifted suddenly and rapidly to high 
tenacity rayon, not only the new employees but also the managers had to adapt 
to a new set of procedures.  The high specifications for high tenacity rayon, 
coupled with these labor problems, led to a vast increase in waste, particularly 
waste viscose.151   
The company struggled with the problem of absenteeism throughout the 
war years.  The spinning room had a particularly high rate, probably in part 
because of unpleasant work conditions: hot, with constant acid fumes.  In the 
words of Charles Leadman, a union official, it was ―not a glorious place to 
work.‖152  Herman Stuhr provided a manager‘s perspective on the new 
employees and the absenteeism problem: 
the ones we were able to dredge up out of the back country during 
the war… in all probability had never seen an industrial plant of 
any kind let alone a rayon plant.  They weren‘t accustomed to 
working in that kind of environment and they weren‘t accustomed 
to making as much money as… [an] industrial job paid him and 
the result was that between the two influences, they would tend to 
work as many days in the week as they felt supplied them with as 
much money as they could live on that week, then they just 
wouldn‘t come to work the rest of the week. 
 
On weekends, sometimes as many as 10 to 20 percent of employees would not 
show up.  This happened with a fair degree of frequency.  Without enough men 
and women to run all the spinning machines, the viscose produced for that 
purpose had to be disposed of.  The company installed an emergency pump to 
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allow all the waste viscose to simply be pumped directly from the viscose cellar 
to the trucks that would take it to the dumping pits.  If twenty percent of the 
work force did not come to work, the company had to scrap roughly 14,000 
gallons of viscose, enough to make 10,000 pounds of rayon tire cord, enough 
for 1,000 truck tires.  Stuhr estimated that 14,000 gallons of viscose would fill 
―a tank ten feet in diameter and 24 feet high.‖153 
The problem ended, Mr. Stuhr notes, at the end of the war when soldiers 
returned home to their jobs, and ―the hillbillies went back to the mountains.‖154  
Part of his perspective seems born out by numbers reflecting waste viscose 
outputs.  After the war, production at the Front Royal plant of rayon for tire 
cord and other purposes continued to grow, though at a slower rate, for several 
years.155  However, the amount of waste viscose decreased from a high point of 
21,000 cubic yards per year in 1945 to roughly 10,000 cubic yards per year.  
Stuhr attributes that to a return to ―normal operation.  The fellows that had 
been in the Army came back and the crisis of incompetent help and that sort of 
thing got straightened out and everything went back to normal.‖156
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Chapter 4 
Treating Toxic Waste 
 
―Normal‖ conditions at the American Viscose plant in 1945 did not 
equate to normalcy for the South Fork of the Shenandoah.  Downstream of 
American Viscose‘s sewer and effluent lines, the riverine half of the river-plant 
complex was in tatters.  Considering the content and quantity of the plant‘s 
waste streams during World War II, it is not surprising that the river‘s aquatic 
life was nearly eliminated.  Unaffected by devastated downstream water quality, 
American Viscose rode the post-war boom, increasing water withdrawals from 
the river without consequence.  Yet the river was never entirely without 
advocates.  Before and during the war, some individuals within the larger 
technological system made efforts to keep toxics out of rivers and streams, 
through capture, recycling, or safe disposal of wastes from rayon 
manufacturing.   
For decades before American Viscose came to the Valley, there were 
always those who responded to the fouling of the Shenandoah with the goal of 
protecting the river, and who defined the river differently, not simply as a 
resource and a dump, but as a recreational, aesthetic, or biologically valuable 
location.  They responded to pollution using what tools they had—whether they 
were sportsmen lobbying the General Assembly for water pollution controls, or 
state scientists using fines and permits to enforce pollution controls, or 
engineers at the rayon plant in search of effective methods to limit pollution.  
Heroes and villains change places over course of the half-decade that the plant 
operated, until it becomes evident that most of the time there were neither 
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heroes nor villains, just people reacting to challenges with limited tools and 
foreknowledge. 
The trajectories by which human beings come to understand and adapt 
to their natural environment are always multilinear, involving experimentation 
to find what works.  Modern technological systems, however, shift, and 
sometimes limit, multilinear exploration by providing buffers from 
environmental harms.  People who can afford to use these systems, or buy their 
outputs, frequently include those in decision-making positions.  Technological 
buffers distance them from human-caused burdens on the natural environment 
and erase the direct cause and effect between people‘s actions and 
environmental harm.  In addition, Western spiritual and scientific thought has 
long fostered the idea that humans are separate from the natural world in some 
way, obscuring our reliance on nature, breeding ―disregard to nature‘s inherent 
value and fragility.‖157   
With buffers both physical and psychological, no longer does the cause of 
an environmental hazard necessarily have to be halted.  A vast range of other 
options are available.  Some water-born pollutants can be filtered, diluted, or 
rendered harmless by the addition of other chemicals.  Government agencies 
can permit a measurable amount of environmental harm to occur so long as it 
stays below certain thresholds.  If these options do not work, polluters often use 
money and influence to reset agency thresholds, rewrite permits, change laws, 
or simply pay off fines rather than clean up harms.  Complicating this picture 
for American Viscose and many other polluters in the 1940s was the incomplete 
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knowledge available at that time about exact correlations between types of 
chemical waste and environmental degradation.  This knowledge is by no 
means complete now, nor will it ever be, as consequences in the natural world 
can never be predicted with absolute accuracy.   
 Part of the problem in the 1940s was that disposing of large quantities of 
chemical waste remained relatively unexplored.  As Craig Colten and Peter 
Skinner explain in their history of industrial waste: 
except for plating, smelting, and certain refinery wastes… most 
persistent and toxic industrial wastes were manageable, at least 
until the 1930s—largely because the volumes produced were 
relatively small.  During the 1930s and 1940s, the organic 
chemicals industry flourished and created a new spectrum of 
wastes whose quantities, toxicity, and persistence took quantum 
leaps. 158 
 
Nevertheless, awareness among industry and the public about hazardous waste 
in the early twentieth century is well documented.159  As early as 1917, a 
leading sanitary engineer argued that ―the impression that the [industrial] 
wastes cannot be successfully treated is in many cases not true.‖160  Scientists 
understood the potential hazards of certain waste disposal practices.  A 1931 
chemical engineering textbook made clear that disposing of ―liquid wastes to the 
ground surface could lead to contamination of groundwater supplies down 
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gradient.‖  Waste treatment practices during this time period tended to focus on 
removing a single ―offending waste‖ from factory effluent.  Although some 
treatment technologies did exist, more often than not companies chose to locate 
in isolated areas to protect them from complaints or relied on rivers to dilute 
their pollutants, based on ―nineteenth-century concepts of natural 
purification.‖161   
 These theories viewed running water as uniformly healthy and capable of 
purifying any waste, while stagnant water harbored death and disease. An older 
theory, reaching back to Plato and Aristotle, speculated that ―water was purified 
by the fire burning at the centre of the earth and protected from pollution by an 
impermeable layer… [therefore] water pollution was a phenomenon that could 
not exist.‖ 162  Much common wisdom in the early twentieth century held to the 
belief that running water could purify itself of any substance through the 
―dilution of wastes and the movement of the water.‖  Thus, in the 1920s, a 
tremendous amount of human and industrial wastes were discharged untreated 
in ―oceans, large rivers, and lakes.‖ 163  When the larger American Viscose 
Corporation (with its seven plants and eighteen thousand employees) was 
established in the U.S. in 1910, this form of disposal of industrial waste was 
common. 
By the 1930s, however, enough shared knowledge was available that 
corporate malfeasance regarding industrial waste could be identified.  A 1939 
article in Industrial and Engineering Chemistry provides insight into the 
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behavior of some corporations with regard to pollution control.  The author 
urged manufacturers to take certain steps to reduce their waste stream by 
working cooperatively with ―trade organizations and pollution control agencies,‖ 
rather than dodging responsibility by ―attempting to avoid waste treatment, 
employing homemade makeshifts, or buying off lower riparian objectors.‖164  An 
influential 1927 book on the rayon industry by engineer M.H. Avram reflected 
the problematic attitudes.  He first explained that any water entering a rayon 
plant will become contaminated with caustic soda, sulfuric acid, and other 
chemicals; ―If these waste waters can be dumped into a sewer or river without 
any neutralizing process it is an advantage.  However, local restrictions may be 
so severe that excessive expense might ensue.‖165  There are two insights here: 
first, that many communities were concerned about harmful chemicals entering 
the environment, and second, that many rayon companies were not.   
   Although the American Viscose plant was considered state of the art in 
1940, its waste control system was never particularly good at protecting the 
river.  Managers cobbled it together on the fly during World War II to deal with 
certain major problems while overlooking others.  Throughout the rest of the 
plant‘s operating life, even with increasingly stringent pollution control laws, 
managers kept tweaking the system but never fixed it.  The waste treatment 
and disposal practices remained essentially the same from the late 1940s until 
the plant closed in 1989 and were never capable of keeping pollution from 
reaching the Shenandoah.   
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American Viscose‘s original state-of-the-art design included a ―complete 
recovery system‖166 to reclaim chemicals and control waste.  This reflected 
1930s trends in industry, perhaps pushed by Depression-era scarcity, to 
recover and reuse waste while conserving raw materials.167  By 1940, such a 
system probably recovered some amount of both the alkaline and acid wastes 
from rayon manufacturing.  New rayon plants in the late 1930s utilized what 
was known as the Cerini process to reclaim caustic solution via dialysis from 
the liquid used for steeping cellulose sheets.  Recovering the solution was 
profitable for the company and also helped with the treatment of some waste, 
lowering its alkalinity and making further treatment and disposal less 
intensive.168   
Courtaulds, the parent company of American Viscose, began to reclaim 
acid waste in 1915 at their Coventry plant due to shortages in chemical 
supplies.169  It appears that some if not all of their AVC plants also included 
some kind of reclaim technology.  At the Front Royal plant, Acid Reclaim 
constituted its own department, a section of the facility with ―a maze of tanks, 
evaporators, coolers, and pipes.‖  Mechanisms within the department pumped 
acid from the spinning baths and back, removing a by-product, anhydrous 
sodium sulfate, that was sold as an industrial product called Glauber‘s salt.  
The system contained millions of gallons of acid.170 
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Other than these reclaim systems, evidence of any additional methods in 
use when the plant opened to prevent chemical pollution at Front Royal is 
inconclusive.  Documents suggest that the facility opened in 1940 either 
without a waste treatment system, or with one that only treated sanitary waste.  
According to a study carried out for the EPA in 1985, American Viscose had a 
basic but essentially ineffective waste-water treatment facility in place prior to 
1946.  Relying on limestone beds, the treatment was inadequate to neutralize 
acid waste or remove a host of other contaminants.171  However, the study does 
not indicate whether the limestone beds were in use from the outset or installed 
later.  A different study completed for the EPA in 2000 states that ―waste 
streams produced during rayon manufacturing at the site were discharged 
directly to the Shenandoah River prior to 1948.‖172  The statement is inaccurate 
on the surface—waste treatment and diversion are known to have occurred 
previously—though it does reflect the essential ineffectiveness of the early 
attempts at treatment.    
The first clear statement in American Viscose documents regarding waste 
treatment systems at the Front Royal plant173 appeared in February 1942 in a 
report written by Mr. E. Roetman.  Roetman was a specialist overseeing waste 
treatment plants at all of AVC‘s factories and worked out of AVC‘s Engineering 
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Department at central headquarters in Philadelphia, PA.174  The report, titled 
―Progress Report on Trade Waste Treatment at Front Royal, ‗Sulfide Waste,‘‖ 
described a ―leak of extremely strong acid‖ into the wastewater treatment plant.  
The acid destroyed the biological action of the plant‘s trickling filter, used to 
treat sulfide wastes.   
Another early reference to the plant‘s waste treatment system came from 
John H. Mallinson, a staff engineer who worked for AVC from 1941 to 1979.  He 
described the early treatment of acid waste.  The facility installed a Dorr 
clarifier in 1946 that separated calcium sulfate and zinc hydroxide from the 
effluent.  Prior to that, however, acid waste simply filtered through two 
chambers filled with calcium hydroxide.  From there, it flowed straight into the 
river.  The effluent was not adequately cleaned, according to Mallinson, because 
the calcium hydroxide was not changed frequently, thus the effluent would not 
be neutralized in the river for ―five or six days.‖  He took his concerns to the 
plant manager in 1943 and was told that ―it was none of [his] business, to stay 
off.‖175 
A December 1943 report, titled ―Neutralization of Waste Acid‖ and 
addressed to seven AVC managers at company headquarters, corroborated the 
problems with the waste acid treatment system.  The report emphasized with 
concern that acid waste from the Front Royal plant ―will be greatly increased‖ 
by wartime expansion of the plant to produce high tenacity rayon.  It notes the 
importance of neutralizing the wastes before they enter the Shenandoah ―to 
render them as harmless as possible.‖  However, previous attempts using the 
                                                 
174
 ―Deposition of John H. Mallinson,‖ 53.  
 
175
 ―Deposition of John H. Mallinson,‖ 52-54.  
 
  
81 
limestone rooms that Mallinson described had limited efficacy: the surface area 
of the limestone was too small and quickly became coated by viscose fibers 
mixed in the acid waste.  In addition, ―the volume and velocity‖ of waste 
entering the chamber overwhelmed the system‘s capacity.  The report 
concluded: ―Successful treatment has never been obtained.‖176 
In addition to Roetman‘s 1942 report on AVC‘s acid waste, he wrote a 
second progress report on the same date discussing treatment of the alkaline 
waste produced at Front Royal.  The engineers had examined sediments on the 
bottom of the South Fork, finding that ―a large part of it‖ was ―precipitated 
cellulose,‖ likely exiting the plant from the viscose sewer.  This heavy cellulose, 
with its high BOD load, originated with the Cerini process that separated 
cellulose from caustic soda.  It is unclear whether, at the time of this report, all 
waste viscose passed through the viscose sewer into the river.  Herman Stuhr 
made clear that the facility had no means of reclaiming waste viscose.  
Particularly during World War II, the volumes of waste viscose exiting the plant 
made it ―completely impractical to even attempt this.‖  Charles Leadman noted 
that the American Viscose plant in Nitro, WV did reclaim some waste viscose, 
but the Front Royal plant ―never reclaimed any viscose at all.  Never had the 
equipment to do it.‖177      
As of 1943, AVC‘s primary mode of waste viscose disposal involved 
dumping the material into unlined pits on the far side of the railroad tracks.  
According to Richard Almy, a mechanical engineer at American Viscose, during 
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the war ―there was an almost continuous process of digging new basins.  It 
became full quite rapidly, particularly in the instance of a power failure or 
major flood, which would generate tons and maybe hundreds of tons of waste‖ 
and fill up a basin.178  Although no War Production Board documents make 
mention of chemical waste disposal, the agency assisted with dumping waste 
viscose, including purchasing buggies for transporting waste to the dumping 
pits.  The convenience and speed of this disposal practice fit well with wartime 
need—it was a quick, easy way to get the materials out of sight and out of mind.     
 Two chemical engineers who worked on water treatment at AVC in the 
late 1940s noted the role of World War II in worsening pollution from the 
American Viscose facility.  In an article in VIW & SWA News, a publication 
dealing with water and sewage issues in the northern Shenandoah Valley, B.N. 
Scheuer and C.W. Joseph explain several problems related to American Viscose 
water‘s treatment system.  The war was a primary issue:  
If World War II had not occurred, this problem would have been 
solved much sooner than it was; not only were many of the 
technically trained employees called into the armed forces, but the 
company was ordered in favor of the war effort to expand its 
production facilities and manufacture new yarns by unfamiliar 
processes.  The problems of this expansion demanded the full time 
service of the remaining technical manpower.  These conditions 
coupled with a general shortage of men and materials precluded 
the development of a process and the installation of a plant for the 
treatment of the acidic waste.179    
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The article went on to acknowledge the facility‘s problem with waste and 
their difficulties discovering effective ways to deal with it.  Their ultimate 
conclusion, however, was that the most effective tools for protecting the South 
Fork from pollution were dry dumps (i.e. the pits of waste viscose and other 
lagoons), fly ash lagoons, and the waste treatment plant.  To the chemists of 
1950, these constituted ―a successful method for the treatment of ‗all of the 
waste all of the time,‘… facilities for safe-guarding the Shenandoah from 
pollution.‖  Much of the theory behind American Viscose‘s early waste-disposal 
procedures had roots in old concepts.  Pouring waste products into lagoons 
allowed dewatering ―by percolation through the ground and evaporation.‖  
Remaining effluent discharged into the South Fork would be ―easily assimilated 
by the river.‖ 180     
The tone of Scheuer and Joseph‘s article is both celebratory and 
defensive, likely written in part in an attempt to improve public relations.  They 
wrote the piece for a local audience roughly five years after the end of the war.  
The Shenandoah had been essentially dead—smelly, foamy, and milky white—
causing frustration and complaint from neighbors, but the engineers noted that 
conditions were improving.  The authors‘ praise of AVC‘s new wastewater 
treatment plant, however, obscured an important piece of history: the company 
had been ordered to build the treatment plant in 1948 by Virginia‘s newly-
formed State Water Control Board (SWCB).181  
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Chapter 5 
Shifting Dynamics and Polluted Consequences  
 
Wastewater treatment at American Viscose did not significantly improve 
until after July 1, 1946, when Virginia Governor William Munford Tuck signed 
the State Water Control Law, one of the first comprehensive statewide efforts to 
control water pollution in the country.  The law required the governor to develop 
a citizen board, with a mission to ―protect existing water quality, to reduce and 
prevent water pollution, and to restore and maintain state waters to a quality 
that would protect human health and aquatic life.‖  Unfortunately, it was a 
weak law with no enforcement mechanism, thus ―manufacturers were under no 
legal obligation to make the [pollution] reductions.‖182  Nevertheless, it marked 
the first steps toward official protection of the South Fork.   
The law was one in a series of events marking a slow shift in dynamics 
between the river and the factory.  These changes illustrate many themes of 
environmental history, including the role of sportsmen in preservation of 
natural systems, changing attitudes toward science and technology in the post-
war years, and the steady unfolding of knowledge regarding the environmental 
and health impacts of certain chemicals.  In Front Royal, requirements of the 
1946 Water Control Law exposed some of the limits of this knowledge as 
engineers dealt with chemicals whose aquatic impacts were unknown.  The law 
also marked the beginning of American Viscose‘s friction with regulatory 
agencies as the company focused on minimizing blame instead of harm.  
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Throughout, consequences of the plant‘s continuing technological momentum 
to aquatic life in the South Fork continued to unfold, outpacing the ability and 
the determination of the company to prevent them. 
In the years immediately following World War II, new and powerful allies 
came to the aid of the South Fork.  As the intense focus on the war receded, the 
consequences of American Viscose‘s massive production operations on the river 
were evident, and there was room again in the political sphere for conversations 
about industrial harms.  Beginning immediately after the war, changes in 
leisure time shifted some of the ways in which the river was used, bringing 
more people to it for recreational purposes.  The tangible impacts of the 
chemical discharge from AVC‘s rayon plant caused grave concern among 
visitors to the Shenandoah and downstream residents.  In 1947, despite the 
company‘s efforts to improve waste treatment, the milky appearance of the 
river—caused by viscose wastes and overflow from the plant‘s cooling tower—
was still visible from the highway bridge en route to Winchester, some thirty-six 
miles by river from American Viscose,183 and even further downstream.  A 
company memo mentioned that a Winchester resident had complained multiple 
times to AVC headquarters in Philadelphia.184  Another memo from the same 
time period stated that ―the condition of the river below our plant has so 
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incensed the public that pressure is being placed on the State Water Control 
Board for action.‖185 
Fortunately for the Shenandoah, some of those neighbors and visitors 
included sport fishermen with connections to the most politically powerful men 
in Virginia.  Their efforts, organized under the auspices of the Izaak Walton 
League of America (IWLA), led to the passage of Virginia‘s 1946 State Water 
Control law.186  The Virginia division of the Izaak Walton League boasted the 
nation‘s most famous fisherman of that era: President Herbert Hoover, an active 
member of the Orange County Chapter.  The influential Virginia Senator A. 
Willis Robertson was also a League member, leading the effort to pass the 
Federal Aid and Wildlife Restoration Act of 1937 (better known as the Pittman-
Robertson Act) that finances wildlife conservation, research, and acquisition of 
wildlife management areas into the present day.187   
The IWLA was a major political force nationwide.  Founded in 1922, it 
grew rapidly into America‘s largest conservation organization with 100,000 
members by the late 1920s.188  Politically, the Izaak Walton League pushed for 
protection of both wildlife and water quality.  The organization had significant 
political success at the federal level in the 1930s, successfully lobbying for some 
                                                 
185
 ―Memorandum: E.T. Roetman to Mr. A.G. McVay: 10-69 – Addition to Waste Treatment Plant 
FR, October 8, 1947,‖ 3; DEQ Documents, SWCB/DEQ v. Avtex Fibers (Front Royal), American Viscose 
Documents – 1942-1949; Avtex Fibers records, CN 37962; LVASRC.   
 
186
 Versar, 3. 
  
187
 ―Division History,‖ Virginia Division of the Izaak Walton League of America, http://www.va-
iwla.org/divhist.html (accessed February 22, 2010).  
 
188
 Jouni Paavola, ―The Izaak Walton League of America,‖ in Encyclopedia of World 
Environmental History, Vol. 2, eds. Shepard Krech, John Robert McNeill, Carolyn Merchant (New York: 
Routledge, 2003), 718.  In comparison, the Sierra Club and Audubon Society had less than 7,000 members 
each. 
 
  
87 
public works funds to be used for sewers and sewage treatment plants, as well 
as sealing old mines.  The IWLA sponsored federal pollution control bills, one of 
which passed Congress in 1939 but was vetoed by President Roosevelt who 
argued that it was too expensive.189 
Within five years of its founding, IWLA members were politically active 
and effective in Virginia.  By 1928, the League was credited with making 
―insistent demands‖ for control of stream pollution and stirring up increased 
public interest in the issue.  The IWLA had a seat on the cooperative committee 
formed to survey and study stream pollution along with representatives from 
industry, the health department, the game and inland fisheries commission and 
others. 190  In 1929, the group partnered with the Garden Clubs of Virginia and 
the Virginia Academy of Science to petition for establishment of what would 
become the Virginia State Park system.  In 1940, the IWLA‘s Arlington-Fairfax 
Chapter won statewide adoption of a fish and wildlife law enforcement 
program.191  By the end of World War II, the League was clearly a respected part 
of the political landscape in Virginia and an active advocate for conservation. 
As a sportsmen‘s organization, the Izaak Walton League had a strong 
connection to the Shenandoah River.  Prior to 1940, the river was ―a Mecca for 
fishermen‖ and one of the best smallmouth bass fisheries in the east.192  With 
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less interference from pollution during those pre-war years, the Shenandoah 
River and its tributaries could provide varied habitats and food sources to 
support a multiplicity of aquatic life.  The river‘s great sinuous meanders 
through the Valley contributed to structural variety within the river, creating a 
diversity of habitat niches.  Deep pools of slow water were interspersed with 
multiple riffles—shallower areas of choppy or ruffled water where the 
smallmouth bass made their home.  Meanders in the river molded the pattern 
of riffles and pools, with deeper water often located along the river‘s concave 
bank.  The rocks underlying the river shaped its bends and contributed 
boulders, cobbles, sediment, and ledges to form the river bottom.  The erosive 
interplay of ―scour and deposition‖ between river current and surrounding rock, 
as well as periodic flood events, ensured that structural characteristics within 
the river remained dynamic.  Riparian trees, growing along the river‘s banks, 
lent further heterogeneity to the river bed by contributing their trunks, limbs, 
and leaves.193  Such features provided habitat to a wide range of fish and other 
aquatic organisms, each requiring niches within the river. 
The relative purity of the pre-war Shenandoah River allowed riverine 
energy cycles to function and support this diversity of aquatic organisms.  
Energy entered the river system via aquatic plants—such as algae, mosses, and 
vascular plants194—as well as terrestrial sources, including the leaves and limbs 
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of riverside trees.  Decomposition made plant matter available to other life 
forms, ranging from microscopic organisms to myriad benthic 
macroinvertebrates inhabiting the river bottom.  Some river species digested 
these plant materials, others feasted on detritus, while the carnivory species ate 
one another.  Higher up in the food webs, the Shenandoah River‘s diverse fish 
species ate smaller organisms and one another.  In addition to the small- and 
largemouth bass favored by sport fishermen, darters, eels, sunfish, chub, trout, 
carp, catfish, darters, crappies, dace, and many more species inhabited 
multiple niches within the river‘s habitat structures and food webs.195 
Such a brief sketch of the Shenandoah River‘s ecology falls far short of 
conveying the remarkable multiplicity of species and their intermingled food 
webs and habitat requirements.  Demonstrating the layers of complexity in 
riverine ecology, two biologists noted that even a seemingly simple organism like 
biofilm, ―the slippery film on the surface of [river] rocks, [is] ―an entire 
ecosystem within itself.‖  Beyond the obvious question of food availability, 
innumerable other factors affected riverine life and health.  For example, water 
turbidity, temperature and pH, as well as concentrations of various nutrients 
and availability of dissolved oxygen could all determine whether particular 
species thrived, survived, or disappeared.  The river‘s non-human history, its 
change over time, emerged out of interactions and relationships between all 
parts of the Shenandoah River ecosystem—from the smallest bacteria to the 
watershed‘s broad landscape.  The very intimacy of these interconnections was 
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where the river escaped human control and limited the extent of human 
understanding.  In 2001, the two biologists noted that associations between 
some components of the river‘s ecology are still ―poorly understood.‖196 
As the country emerged from World War II, it became clear that the 
polluted effluent from American Viscose had severed these complex riverine 
relationships in the Shenandoah downstream of the plant.  Surveys by the U.S. 
Fish and Wildlife Service found ―practically no fish in the river and almost a 
complete destruction of bottom animals (fish food such as mayfly nymphs, 
caddis fly larvae, and hellgrammites).‖197  The Izaak Walton League‘s chapter in 
Berryville, Virginia—located just a few miles west of the Shenandoah River—
took the lead in pressuring the Virginia General Assembly to clean up the river 
and curtail American Viscose‘s toxic effluent.  A brief 1946 article in the IWLA 
newspaper, Outdoor America, credited the chapter‘s founder, H. Blackburn 
Moore, as being ―largely responsible for drafting the legislation and steering it to 
successful passage… almost without opposition by the last Virginia legislature.‖  
The chapter sought to follow up this victory by securing IWLA representation on 
the State Water Control Board (SWCB) that the Governor of Virginia was in the 
process of appointing.198  The Board‘s mission was to ―protect existing water 
quality, to reduce and prevent water pollution, and to restore and maintain 
state waters to a quality that would protect human health and aquatic life.‖199 
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Edgar Blackburn ―Blackie‖ Moore—of unknown relation to H. Blackburn 
Moore—served as the Delegate representing Berryville in the Virginia General 
Assembly from 1933-1967, including a seventeen-year tenure as Speaker of the 
House.  An extremely influential Democratic politician, Moore held a seat on the 
SWCB from its creation in 1946 until 1970, chairing the board for most of that 
time period.200  It seems likely that Delegate Moore played an important role in 
passing the 1946 law.  Although his relationship to the IWLA‘s H. Blackburn 
Moore is unclear, their similar names, Berryville addresses, and mutual interest 
in water quality suggest a close familial tie and likely political cooperation. 
E. Blackburn Moore surfaces once, dramatically, in the American Viscose 
documents, hinting at the multilinear development of water quality law in 
Virginia and the potential for one person to significantly influence 
interpretations of law.  In a memo dated October 10, 1947, AVC engineer T.F. 
Brastown described a visit to Richmond to meet with ―Mr. Hedgepeth,‖ an 
engineer employed as the Executive Secretary of the Virginia State Water 
Control Board.  They arrived in Richmond to find Hedgepeth very upset.  He 
had met ―that same morning‖ with the Chairman of the SWCB, Mr. E. 
Blackburn Moore, who told him that he ―could no longer discuss results or 
data, make any commitments, or venture any opinion as to what was adequate 
treatment or as to whether results were satisfactory.  All cases would have to 
appear before the WCB, and they would be the judges of what constituted 
pollution.‖  In addition, Moore interpreted the law to say that wastes from new 
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facilities or expanded production could not be grandfathered into existing waste 
streams but ―must be completely treated so as to carry no pollution load.‖201  
Moore‘s instructions did not sit well with Hedgepeth who told the AVC 
engineers that ―this was not the type of job he had taken, and that if the policy 
continued the WCB did not need an engineer, but only lawyers.‖  He continued, 
saying that ―if the activities of the Board become influenced by politics, 
pollution control is dead.‖202  The memo opens more questions than it answers 
about the contrast between Hedgepeth‘s philosophy and Moore‘s, but it offers a 
glimpse into the conflicts of interpretation and action surrounding early official 
attempts to regulate waste and protect water.  The forces that shaped water 
pollution control were contingent and cultural human responses to the state of 
the river. 
Within American culture, sportsmen—usually fishermen and hunters—in 
the Izaak Walton League and other sporting organizations came from a long 
tradition of conservation ethics and initiatives.  Scholar John F. Reiger traces 
the origins of environmental conservation to ―American sportsmen, those who 
hunted and fished for pleasure rather than for commerce or necessity.‖  
Although sporting clubs have a long history in the U.S., dating back to 1732, a 
sense of widespread group identity emerged later, in the years following the 
Civil War.  National sporting newspapers—American Sportsman, Forest and 
Stream, and Field and Stream—helped created a sense of belonging to a group 
                                                 
201
 ―Memorandum: T.F. Brastow to Mr. A.G. McVay and Mr. E.T. Roetman: Visit to Mr. 
Hedgepeth – Virginia Water Control Board, October 10, 1947,‖ 1; DEQ Documents, SWCB/DEQ v. Avtex 
Fibers (Front Royal), American Viscose Documents – 1942-1949; Avtex Fibers records, CN 37962; 
LVASRC.   
 
202
 ―Memorandum: T.F. Brastow to Mr. A.G. McVay and Mr. E.T. Roetman,‖ 2.  
 
  
93 
with a defined and shared code of ethics: ―true sportsmen practice proper 
etiquette in the field, give game a sporting chance, and possess an aesthetic 
appreciation of the whole environmental context of sport that included a 
commitment to its perpetuation.‖203 
The years following the Civil War also saw new public support for 
creation and enforcement of policies protecting fish and wildlife.  Westward 
expansion, railroads, and industrialization were rapidly depleting wildlife, 
streams, and forests.  The year 1873 found Forest and Stream editor Charles 
Hallock articulating a platform similar to that espoused by the Izaak Walton 
League decades later:   
protection of watersheds and scientific management of forests; 
establishment of uniform game laws dictated by geography, 
habitat, and migration patterns, rather than judicial accident; 
creation of a science and industry of fish culture that would 
develop new strains of game fish and restock depleted waters; 
abatement of water pollution…204 
 
A ―club movement‖ of anglers and hunters began in the 1870s to address these 
problems.  They formed clubs and associations at local, state, and national 
levels focusing on issues like game-protection and fish culture laws.  In 1874, 
William F. Parker, editor of American Sportsman celebrated ―the sportsmen of 
America [who] are banding themselves together for the purpose of checking and 
controlling the wanton and wasteful destruction of nature‘s best gifts intended 
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for the heritage of universal man, and not for the benefit of the reckless and 
greedy few.‖  By 1878, Hallock counted hundreds of such clubs in the U.S.205 
If sporting clubs helped generate a sense of identity and a venue for 
action, the private sphere, in which codes and traditions of ethical conduct were 
passed down between family members, remained important for shaping 
connections to the natural world.  Many of the leading figures in conservation, 
from Thoreau to Pinchot, Leopold to Theodore Roosevelt, describe hunting and 
fishing both alone and with family and friends as key to their interest in the 
natural world.  For many, ―the pursuit of wildlife seems to have provided the 
crucial first contact with the natural world that spawned a commitment to its 
perpetuation.‖206  Two of those early leaders, Teddy Roosevelt and George Bird 
Grinnell, founded the Boone and Crocket Club in 1887.  Reiger credits this as 
the first private organization to deal with national conservation issues 
effectively, predating John Muir‘s Sierra Club.207      
Reiger makes an important point that, even in the 1800s, interest in 
conservation measures originated in the upper classes.  In general, these were 
people who did not need to hunt and fish to survive but could approach the 
activity as a leisure pastime.  Publications frequently carried descriptions of 
conflicts between the angler wanting to protect his favorite fishing hole and the 
commercial fisherman, an early version of the ―jobs versus the environment‖ 
debate.  This trend is evident in Virginia in the 1930s and ‗40s with powerful 
political figures from the state‘s patrician class invested in protection of the 
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Shenandoah‘s water quality for fishing.  Nevertheless, interest in the natural 
world grew among broader swaths of the American population in the 20th 
century.  The 1928 stream survey, which the IWLA helped to initiate, cited 
increased public interest in stream quality as one justification for the study.  
They speculated that more people were getting out to the country due to an 
increase in road building, and more travelers came to rural Virginia because of 
advertising of the state‘s historical and recreational sites.208 
 Interest in wildlife also began to shift following World War II, especially as 
suburban sprawl despoiled the countryside.  Public pressure from scientists 
and citizens led to changes at the federal Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife 
(SFW), which in 1974 became the Fish and Wildlife Service.  Segments of the 
urban and suburban population sought opportunities to ―watch wild animals in 
the wild,‖ not to hunt them.  Surveys recorded millions of Americans 
participating in bird watching, nature walks, and nature photography.  
Meanwhile, scientists pushed the SFW to extend preservation efforts beyond 
fish and game to endangered species.209   
Despite these shifts, sports fishermen and hunters continued to play 
important roles in conservation in the postwar years.  In some instances, 
members of the ―hook and bullet‖ groups could make headway on pollution 
abatement where ―bird and bunny boys‖ and concerned housewives were more 
easily marginalized.210  Automotive giant Ford‘s River Rouge production complex 
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caused tremendous air and water pollution of the community of Dearborn, 
Michigan and the Rouge River.211  Remarkably (from today‘s perspective), 
complaints about the pollution came not just from Ford‘s neighbors but also 
from their employees.  Despite massive air pollution problems, water pollution 
received the most attention due to the involvement of sportsmen.  In Michigan, 
customers, employees, and plant managers alike tended to hunt and fish and 
thus shared a common interest and respect.  Cooperative efforts resulted in 
modest strengthening of the state‘s water quality law in 1949 and slow 
improvements in pollution abatement by Ford.212 
Sportsmen in various states played a key role in an important water 
quality dispute nearly a decade later in 1957.  The 1956 amendments to the 
federal Water Pollution Control Act strengthened the federal government‘s 
ability to enforce water pollution regulations in instances of interstate pollution.  
At the request of a state pollution control agency, the federal government could 
pursue an abatement suit, and if public health was endangered, the 
government no longer had to receive the consent of all States involved.213  The 
first use of this law came at the instigation of sport fishermen in Louisiana.  In 
much of the U.S., a state public health department oversaw water quality 
issues.  In Louisiana, however, that responsibility resided with the state fish 
and game agency.  As a result, the health of aquatic life became an important 
indicator for pollution problems.  In this case, sportsmen‘s activity in centered 
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around ―ad hoc advocacy groups‖ rather than national organizations like the 
IWLA, but, with authority based in long traditions of ―common access to fish 
and game,‖ they effectively exerted pressure at local, state, and national 
political levels.214   
Sportsmen played a mediating role, not only between levels of 
government and various economic interests, but also between old and new 
conservation values.  Sportsmen wanting to protect the Shenandoah and other 
rivers exerted a different kind of force, based on their uses of the river and their 
perspectives on its importance.  Although fishermen engaged in a type of 
extraction, it was non-industrial, based on enjoyment and enmeshed in a 
system of values that emphasized protecting both the fish as a species and the 
river as their natural habitat.  The momentum of conservation grew in volume 
and intensity in the postwar years, picking up other concerns that went beyond 
protection of wildlife habitat and water quality.   
The efforts of sportsmen, regulators, and other early post-war 
conservationists, however, did not generally seek to undermine business 
interests, and those with concerns about industrial activity kept a low profile.  
Facing a national ―consensus‖ following World War II that encouraged patriotic 
conformity, respect for authority, and ―a commitment to a vague notion of an 
American way of life defined by prosperity, material comfort, and a secure 
home,‖ dissenters faced the threat of being labeled disloyal, or worse,  
Communists. 215  Scientists‘ role in creating successful wartime technologies led 
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to an unprecedented leap in funding for research and development from 
government and industry, reaching ―levels unheard of for any profession in the 
history of the United States.‖216  Overall, America emerged from World War II 
with an uncritical commitment to technology and innovation provided by 
benevolent corporations.  DuPont‘s slogan ―better things for better living... 
through chemistry‖ had a literal meaning.217   
This friendliness toward business and industry was evident in the way 
that regulators approached water quality protection.  Corporations took a ―go-
slow‖ approach, pacing out improvements to their waste disposal practices to 
limit impacts on their profits.  Regulators and plant engineers had tacit 
agreements to work together behind the scenes, usually without legal pressure 
or public input, in order to protect the national reputation of the corporation.218  
The situation at American Viscose in Front Royal mimicked this scenario.  
Memos clearly demonstrate that AVC engineers, both at the Front Royal waste 
treatment plant and at the company headquarter in Philadelphia, worked 
closely with the Virginia State Water Control Board.  In return, Mr. Hedgepeth, 
the SWCB‘s lead engineer, stated ―that his office was assuming that industry is 
honest and competent and will accept reports‖ made by AVC at face value.219   
Although the Clean Water Act of 1972 gives the Virginia Department of 
Environmental Quality (DEQ) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
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significantly more regulatory authority, the current system in place today 
reflects that friendliness to business and remains largely self-monitoring; 
companies design their own pollution control systems and collect their own 
samples.  Ralph Bolgiano, the State Water Control Board regional biologist who 
monitored Avtex‘s permits during its final years, explained that the current 
approach ―wasn‘t always the best thing for the environment, but legally, it was 
the way it was set up.‖  He noted that the system could work effectively: ―it has 
some advantages. Most people live up to your expectations of them… You give 
some people the autonomy to do things the way they want to do them, and if 
they care at all, they‘ll probably do a better job.‖220 
A variety of events and cultural trends converged in the decades following 
World War II to undermine the pro-technology consensus in the U.S. and build 
a critical debate about industrial environmental harms.  Whereas sportsmen 
had access to power and the type of social authority necessary to challenge 
pollution in the years immediately following the war, other voices slowly gained 
a place in the public sphere.  Rachel Carson‘s transformative voice might have 
entered the debate sooner; her concern about man‘s impact to the natural 
world intensified following the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 
1945.  Her research into the impacts from chemical pesticides began in the 
1950s, yet in part because of the national attitude toward science and 
technology, she waited to publish her findings until 1962.  By then, various 
national and global health scares were undermining popular perceptions of 
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industrial benevolence: strontium-90 from above ground nuclear tests appeared 
in milk and caused cancer in children; the carcinogenic herbicide aminotriazole 
entered the food supply despite government regulation; and the flu medicine 
thalidomide led to tragic birth defects.221  All of these raised questions about the 
unqualified dependability of scientific discoveries.   
These events and Carson‘s book raised questions within certain scientific 
communities and challenged them to take a more public and active role.  A 
1962 Ecological Society of America report stated: ―Silent Spring created a tide of 
opinion which will never again allow professional ecologists to remain 
comfortably aloof from public responsibility.‖  The ecologists realized the 
necessity of providing an ―authoritative voice‖ to citizens and policymakers.  
―Popular ecologists‖ like Rachel Carson, Aldo Leopold, and others used the 
vocabulary of ecology to critique modern science and technology and build ―a 
moral case about the proper relationship between society and nature.‖  Their 
language and ideas found resonance among a public watching increasingly 
serious environmental harms unfold.  Meanwhile, professionals within the 
discipline of ecology retained a deep connection to modern science, the military-
industrial complex, and a managerial perspective toward natural systems.222  
This approach proved useful in appealing to many Congressional leaders 
interested in pollution control and concerned about the public anger over 
environmental degradation. 
The public fear and anger that drove the passage of new water quality 
protection and toxic waste remediation laws expanded as examples of 
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environmental harm became more visible and had a more personal impact.  
Previous conservation activists tended to be drawn from groups like the IWLA 
and National Wildlife Federation, the Garden Club of America, outdoor and 
wilderness enthusiasts with the Sierra Club and Wilderness Society, as well as 
a smattering of scientists.223  Environmental conservation in the late 1960s and 
‗70s, however, grew into a widespread public concern that resulted in much 
stronger laws protecting water quality.   
The factors feeding into this increased environmental concern were 
numerous.  Part of the cause, as articulated by historian Tom McCarthy, was 
simply that ―when industrial pollution got bad it affected someone‘s pursuit of 
‗the good life‘ and people complained.‖224  Sportsmen complained sooner 
because their ―pursuit of the ‗good life‘‘‖ put them in direct contact with 
environmental degradation early on.  More widespread outrage about industrial 
pollution occurred as it affected more of the population.  The growing network 
of roads and more widespread availability of automobiles opened the 
countryside and wilderness to Americans.  Interest in outdoor recreation 
increased dramatically after WWII with the availability of ―cheap unrationed 
gasoline, higher living standards, and paid vacations.‖225  A report to the 
Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Commission, however, found that ―water 
pollution [was] diminishing the number of recreation waters‖ for swimming and 
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boating as well as fishing and waterfowl hunting.226  Thus, while outdoor 
excursions and experiences sparked a greater interest in nature, they also 
exposed more Americans to polluted landscapes. 
Likewise, car culture facilitated the expansion of human dwellings into 
the countryside.  Suburbanization was an important part of post-war culture, 
spurred on by a housing shortage and increased demand for housing.  During 
the war, the U.S. government urged citizens to save money and invest in war 
bonds as a patriotic duty to support the war effort and prepare for a post-war 
economy.  Even before the war ended, advertisers promoted a post-war 
consumer culture: according to a Royal typewriter ad, ―what this war is all 
about [is the right to] once more walk into any store in the land and buy 
anything you want.‖227  The suburban single-family home topped the list of 
desirable consumer items and was promoted by government and industry in 
hopes that it (and appliances to fill it) would be a ―pump primer for the postwar 
economy,‖ preventing a return of the pre-war economic depression.228  The 
success of this vision could be seen in vast single-family suburbs such as 
Lakewood Park and Levittown. 
In suburban landscapes, however, environmental degradation often 
became personal.  In historian Adam Rome‘s words, ―the bulldozer was never 
far from the living room,‖ and in that intimate space, the destructive nature of 
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post-war industry intruded into the comfortable world of post-war prosperity.  
Life in the suburbs exposed Americans to a range of environmental ills, 
including the disappearance of wildlife and scenic countryside as land was 
cleared and leveled for development.  In addition, building in environmentally 
sensitive areas meant homeowners had to deal with problems like erosion and 
flooding.229   
As for water pollution, Rome observes that that more Americans may 
have become attuned to the need for water quality protection due to living with 
a septic system in the suburbs than from observing industrial pollution in 
rivers and streams.  Rapid suburban construction far away from centralized 
sewer systems required the use of septic tanks.  Unplanned growth and 
problems with siting and design led to frequent system failures and 
contamination of streams, groundwater, and eventually drinking water.  
Synthetic laundry detergents also escaped into the environment via septic 
systems, appearing not just as suds in wells and tap water but also in rivers 
and lakes, sometimes forming ―floating mountains of foam.‖230   
By the early 1960s, personal fears of drinking water contamination and 
health impacts from chemicals made water pollution an issue for millions of 
Americans who might otherwise have paid little attention.231  The public outcry 
spurred passage of increasingly strong water quality protection laws.  Indeed, 
during the debate surrounding the 1972 Clean Water Act, a Republican official 
in Long Island contacted President Nixon‘s staff to express strong support for 
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the law; his locality‘s rapid population growth was seriously exacerbating 
pollution of groundwater by leaking septic systems. 232  Polluting industries and 
politicians were both discovering that ―any industrial firm that crossed 
purposes with the American homeowner‘s conception of ‗home, sweet home‘ 
risked messing with a force more powerful than itself.‖233   
Growing media attention also contributed to support for stronger 
environmental protections.  The environment became a significant topic for 
news coverage in the 1960s, with the annual number of stories on the subject 
reaching an initial peak around 1970.234  During the postwar years, the number 
of households with a television skyrocketed.  In 1950, 9% of U.S. households 
had a television.  By 1955, the number jumped to 64.5%.  Ten years later, 
92.6% of households had television, and by 1972, the year the Clean Water Act 
became law, that number was 95.8%235       
The visual power of television also brought news of environmental harms 
and disasters into American living rooms.  The Santa Barbara oil spill in 
January of 1969, followed by the Cuyahoga River fire a few months later, were 
powerful visible symbols of ―the ability of modern industry to turn the grace and 
beauty of nature into something grotesque.‖236  Wider availability of newspapers 
and other print media likewise increased knowledge of environmental problems 
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occurring in other parts of the country and the world.  Mainstream media often 
picked up news stories first covered by the publications of sportsmen‘s and 
conservation organizations.  A New York Times editorial opposing aerial 
pesticide spraying in 1958 helped to bring that issue to public attention.  Even 
before Silent Spring, articles voicing concern about pesticide spraying appeared 
in widely-read publications like Reader’s Digest, Life, and Saturday Evening 
Post.  Even Sports Illustrated covered the topic, showing the clear interest 
among mainstream media in exploring these issues.237   
Years later, beginning in 1978, TV broadcasts and print media showed 
dioxin and other toxic chemicals, with their attendant health impacts, leaching 
into the homes and schools of residents in an upstate New York suburban 
community built in the post-war years.  The Love Canal tragedy spurred 
another national outcry, this time in support of federal legislation to clean up 
toxic waste.238  In 1980, President Carter signed into law the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), better 
known as the Superfund Act.   
Congress and the post-war Presidents responded to public fear and 
anger over environmental pollution and its public health threats with varying 
degrees of commitment.  President Eisenhower, for example, referred to polluted 
waters as ―a uniquely local blight‖ that should be dealt with accordingly.  
Business owners, as well as local and state officials, welcomed this approach, 
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and it was enshrined in the 1948 Water Pollution Control Act.239  This first 
federal water quality law and its 1956 amendments lacked any federal 
enforcement power and focused mostly on public health.240   
The shift from this approach to the commitment of Senator Edmund 
Muskie and his staff to steadily strengthen federal oversight of water quality 
protection shows the political momentum building around protection of the 
environment.  Most important was the unveiling of industrial hazards combined 
with increasing public awareness of environmental problems.  In the 
background, however, groups with no particular ―environmentalist‖ stripes—
from politicians seeking votes to local officials seeking ―pork‖ appropriations for 
water control and water treatment projects—helped move federal water quality 
laws forward.  Likewise, the philosophy that shaped the 1972 Clean Water Act 
was not based strictly on the holistic concerns of ―popular ecology‖ but 
incorporated much from post-war professional science and systems thinking.241 
By 1980, the federal government enacted a host of laws with the goals of, 
among others, preventing water and air pollution, cleaning up toxic waste, and 
protecting workplace health and safety: laws that would have tremendous 
impact on the 440-acre site of the rayon plant in Front Royal.  They would also 
have broader implications, often leading to better methods of buffering the 
public from environmental hazards rather than stopping them at the source.      
Although the new environmental laws and regulations were 
overwhelmingly beneficial overall, the ironies and unintended consequences of 
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increased public concern for the natural environment were plentiful: people 
pressed for a cleaner environment in part because new environment-harming 
technologies like cars and roads allowed them to explore previously remote 
areas and experience them more personally; likewise, suburban development 
brought people into closer contact with nature while causing environmental 
destruction.  In other words, the new degree of public concern did not 
necessarily recognize the depth of public complicity.   
A somewhat similar set of ironies accompanied efforts to clean up 
pollution.  Unless pollution was stopped at the source—in other words, no 
longer created—attempts to clean it almost always resulted in displacement of 
the pollutants.  For instance, adding scrubbers to the steel mill smokestacks in 
Gary, Indiana to meet Clean Air Act guidelines significantly lowered airborne 
emissions.  Once removed, however, the particulate matter became a form of 
toxic solid waste.  No harmless form of hazardous pollution disposal exists—it 
always impacts someone or some natural system.  In Gary, the steel mill 
management chose to dumped the ash near low-income communities, 
particularly communities of color.242  
The same phenomenon occurred with wastes that had previously been 
disposed of in the water.  Water pollution regulation resulted in a number of 
corporations turning to landfilling techniques.243  Hooker Chemical‘s decision to 
bury its chemical wastes at Love Canal was a common choice.  The difference 
between Hooker and American Viscose in this regard was that the former had to 
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bury waste off-site while AVC had adequate space to landfill chemicals, like the 
hydroxide sludge, on their own property.  Nevertheless, toxics have a way of 
escaping human control, and much of the hazardous material cleaned out of 
AVC‘s acid and alkaline waste streams ended up back in the river.  
American Viscose‘s troubles began early, following passage of the 1946 
Virginia Water Control Act.  In order to meet the new requirements, AVC 
installed new technology to neutralize the acid discharges.  The process first 
involved mixing the alkaline, acid, and sanitary wastes coming from the plant in 
a large storage pit.  The alkaline chemicals immediately neutralized part of the 
sulfuric acid and were ―completely neutralized‖ in return.244  The remaining 
waste acid was mixed with lime slurry to complete the neutralization process. 
The reaction between sulfuric acid and lime created a mix of calcium sulfate 
and zinc hydroxide, a material that ―is perpetually the consistency of 
toothpaste.‖  A Dorr filter, installed in September 1946 in response to the new 
Virginia law, separated the calcium sulfate and zinc hydroxide from the 
effluent.245  The sludge was pumped to waste lagoons along the river‘s edge for 
final storage.246  By 1989, these sulfate/hydroxide basins covered roughly 85 
acres and held an estimated 936,000 cubic yards of sludge.247   
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Although Scheuer and Joseph celebrated this waste treatment system in 
their 1950 article, and Scheuer published a scholarly paper about it in 
February of 1948, AVC‘s waste treatment did not work particularly well in 
practice.  In October of 1947, the inadequacy of the system was causing serious 
problems.  The volume of waste, AVC engineer Roetman wrote, ―‖has 
overwhelmed the plant.‖  The quantity of calcium sulfate sludge incessantly 
clogged the vacuum filter meant to help separate it out of suspension.  The 
sludge piled up in the settling tank, and as a consequence, some calcium 
sulfate consistently washed into the river, creating a milky appearance.  In 
addition, the equipment for introducing lime into the acid wastes had to 
constantly operate at its maximum level, leaving ―no reserve capacity to take 
care of the slugs of acid that frequently appear.‖248       
Scheuer‘s article in Chemical Engineering revealed a willingness at 
American Viscose to stretch or obscure the truth.  The company considered a 
response to the calcium sulfate build-up that reflects this attitude.  Calcium 
sulfate built up so quickly on every surface at the treatment plant that the 
facility had to shut down weekly for cleaning.  ―During the periodic shutdowns,‖ 
Roetman wrote, ―the waste enters the river untreated.‖  He continued, 
demonstrating the corporation‘s attitude toward the Virginia law and suggesting 
their past approach to the problem: ―As these occur at frequent intervals, they 
cannot be passed off to the State as unforeseen accidents.‖  Roetman concluded 
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that AVC must add more equipment and facilities to deal with the overloaded 
treatment plant.249 
Interestingly, the State Water Control Board engineer, L.L. Hedgepeth, 
was also willing to cut corners.  In November 1947, he offered AVC engineers 
several suggestions to improve the appearance of the Shenandoah and thus 
decrease complaints from the public.  The suggestions dealt with cosmetic 
issues rather than a serious effort to decrease waste or treat it more effectively.  
He proposed changing the design of the outlet pipe to eliminate foaming when 
the effluent went into the river.  Multiple outlets into the South Fork, 
Hedgepeth thought, might prevent so much concentration of waste on one side 
of the river while mixing and diluting the ―off color‖ material more thoroughly in 
the river water.  Four or five outlets attached to separate sewers, he guessed, 
should do the trick.250      
Some of AVC‘s struggle with toxic waste disposal, however, seemed to 
have been legitimately caused by a lack of knowledge about certain chemicals 
and their impacts.  In August of 1947, for example, five of AVC‘s engineers sat 
down with the SWCB‘s Hedgepeth to discuss the company‘s application for a 
state certificate allowing discharge of wastes into the Shenandoah River.  Two 
items on the agenda dealt with questions that neither the state official nor the 
AVC engineers could immediately answer.  Neither knew for certain the level of 
B.O.D. in the cellulose bearing waste found on the river bottom or the duration 
of its impact in the river.  In addition, the group lacked knowledge regarding 
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xanthates: sulfur compounds produced by the reaction of CS2 with white crumb 
that was known to be toxic to aquatic life.  The engineers‘ review of scientific 
research did not locate a method for determining xanthate levels in their waste 
stream.  Hedgepeth promised to have the state look into both questions.251  An 
AVC document from October of the same year reported that the engineers had 
found a basic testing technique but could not guarantee its efficacy for locating 
all xanthates.  They could, however, state ―with certainty that sulphur 
compounds exist in our waste etc.‖252   
A 1948 memo showed American Viscose continuing to struggle with 
scientific uncertainty.  The company initiated independent testing through the 
Institute of Textile Technology laboratory in Charlottesville, VA to see if the 
plant‘s treatment process was adequate to prevent toxicity to aquatic life.  Even 
the experts at this lab did not have all the answers; they could determine ―the 
effects of various wastes on fish life but at present cannot study the effects on 
fish food.‖253  Despite these gaps in knowledge, however, the company 
continued to produce both rayon and polluting waste at full capacity.   
Richard Almy, who worked as plant engineer at American Viscose, 
described another scenario from the early 1940s in which lack of knowledge 
combined with war time urgency to create environmental havoc.  Almy 
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explained that no impervious clay liners were ever installed in the viscose pits, 
hydroxide sludge lagoons, or other holding basins to minimize migration of 
chemicals.  Foremen received minimal instruction: ―get a bulldozer, go down 
there and dig the soil up on the sides of the basin with laborers and a bulldozer, 
make a road to it.‖  Almy acknowledged that the technology to make clay liners 
was available at the time but stated that ―nobody, to my knowledge, ever 
thought of the need for that sort of thing… We just dug a big hole and put the 
waste products in it.‖  Speaking in 1990, Almy emphasized the change over 
time in his understanding of waste disposal procedures: ―Of course in 
retrospect that was a bad decision, but we were learning, like everybody else 
was, about things like that.  Now, that is a very bad thing to do, to dig a basin 
and not line it.‖254 
Despite increasing knowledge about chemical waste disposal in the years 
following World War II, the engineers and managers at the rayon plant did not 
take appreciable measures to correct problems.  Indeed, a degree of stasis 
seemed to hold sway at the rayon plant‘s waste treatment facility under all 
three of its owners: American Viscose Corporation, FMC Corporation, and Avtex 
Fibers, Inc.  Despite the evident concern and efforts of some waste treatment 
engineers, the procedures in use when Avtex purchased the plant in 1976 were 
very similar to the process described by B.N. Scheuer in 1947.  Modest changes 
occurred along the way.  In the early 1970s, the company built a carbon 
disulfide recovery plant, and in 1974, began to reclaim zinc from the effluent 
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stream.255  In 1983, under the direction of the EPA, Avtex began to run its 
waste viscose through the wastewater treatment plant instead of landfilling it 
on site.256  The company continued to use lagoons as part of their waste 
treatment process; by the time the company closed, the viscose pits and waste 
lagoons covered 220 acres, approximately half the site (see fig. 16).257   
The largest basins were located along the banks of the South Fork with 
only a modest dike separating toxic from aquatic.  According to Ralph Bolgiano, 
no waste materials ever really left the Avtex site:  ―Everything that Avtex ever 
removed from their waste stream, they just pumped it back into one of their 
lagoons.‖258  Acid and alkaline wastes were mixed and neutralized in unlined 
basins; the resulting hydroxide sludge went into six vast storage lagoons; and 
fly ash from the power house piled up in five large landfills (see fig. 17).  The 
company could pay off fines when they violated the terms of their discharge 
permit, but the Shenandoah suffered the consequences of the unlined lagoons 
and waste viscose pits built to contain toxic wastes. 
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Figure 16. Aerial view of the Avtex site, 1998.  Many of the factory buildings on the left-hand side of 
the picture have been demolished, but the unlined sulfate, fly ash, and waste viscose basins along the 
South Fork remain filled with waste almost a decade after rayon production ceased.  Source: U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers, “Front Royal Virginia: Avtex Superfund Site Aerial Views - 1998,” 
http://www.nao.usace.army.mil/projects/Environmental%20Projects/Avtex/AvtexAerials.asp 
(accessed July 7, 2010). 
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Figure 17.  EPA map of the Avtex Fibers Superfund Site.  Source: EPA Mid-Atlantic Superfund, 
http://www.epa.gov/reg3hwmd/super/sites/VAD070358684/prap/ figure01.pdf (accessed April 27, 
2009). 
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The problem of unlined waste lagoons brings us back to the deeper 
history of the river, rooted in the geological formations beneath the Avtex site.  
The site is underlain with bedrock of the Ordovician-age Martinsburg 
Formation, a sedimentary rock type composed mostly of ―alternating layers of 
shale and lithic sandstone, and minor limestone interbeds.‖  These rocks can be 
found in various parts of the Valley, mostly associated with the Massanutten 
Synclinorium.  A synclinorium is ―different from mere synclines because they 
are more complicated: the overall synclinal shape is ‗decorated‘ with numerous 
smaller anticlines and synclines.‖259  The simplest explanation of anticlines and 
synclines is to say that they are rocks pushed together by opposing tectonic 
pressures into curved folds.  A syncline, like the Massanutten formation, is a 
downward arc, like a bowl; the edges of the bowl are pushed upward while the 
competing pressures force the inner rocks downward.  In the case of 
Massanutten, two long ridges of sandstone are the edges of the bowl with Fort 
Valley as the downward arc.  Although millennia of erosion and weathering 
reshaped the rocks, traces of the Synclinorium and mountain building 
processes remain.  Although Front Royal is separated from modern day 
Massanutten mountain, this major landscape feature still impacts surrounding 
areas as the lower level sedimentary rocks were uplifted as the Synclinorium 
formed. 
Toxic materials from the unlined pits and lagoons on the Avtex site 
migrated through the ―minor limestone interbeds‖ in the shale bedrock.  Rock 
formations directed the leakage in different directions, but some ended up in 
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the South Fork.  In the late 1980s, a neighbor of the plant and former Avtex 
employee, described ―the place where…the river dies. ‗You won‘t see a frog, a 
bug, a bird…‘ Gaseous bubbles come up from the bottom of the placid 
stream.‖260  Bolgiano explained the source of the bubbles releasing from the 
sulfate lagoons into underground cracks in the rock: 
in the middle of the river, you could see places where everything 
would be nice and green, the water would look great, and then 
you‘d see a little rock stick up there.  It‘d have a white hole in it, 
and the white was some bacteria or fungus that was capable of 
utilizing the sulphur… There‘d be water coming out which, if you 
put your finger in the hole and jiggled it around, it‘d be black 
because it would be sulfite down there before it hit the [river] 
water with oxygen in it… It‘d be black, sticky, rotten-egg smell and 
so forth.  You could find these on the river bottom, hundreds of 
yards – hundreds and hundreds of yards – from the lagoons.261   
 
A significant portion of the underground pollutant stream did not, 
however, go directly into the South Fork.  A smaller anticline (formed when 
competing tectonic pressures push rocks upward into an arched shape) in the 
bedrock beneath Avtex formed a kind of tube extending beneath the South Fork 
of the Shenandoah, providing ―important structural control on the movement of 
the dense carbon disulfide plume.‖262  This wave of pollution originated beneath 
the three newer waste viscose pits, filled between 1958-1983.  The pits were 
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probably excavated ―close to, if not into, bedrock,‖ and contain a total of 9.8 
million cubic feet of viscose sludge.263   
The chemical reaction that allows cellulose to be regenerated into rayon 
also caused the carbon disulfide plume of contamination in the groundwater.  
Mixing ―white crumb‖ with carbon disulfide to produce sodium cellulose 
xanthate (―yellow crumb‖) is a reversible reaction.  When left to age, waste 
viscose steadily releases carbon disulfide.  In the waste basins, the CS2 took an 
aqueous form as rainwater percolated through the viscose.264  In addition, plant 
engineers used fly ash from the plant‘s coal-fired boilers to build berms 
between some of the viscose pits.  The berms, in turn, leached chemicals that 
interacted with the waste viscose to form arsenic.265  All of the chemicals 
eventually entered and contaminated the groundwater.   
The anticline prevented the contamination from spreading widely.  
Instead, it channeled the material under the river and directly into the wells of 
the neighborhood across the river from Avtex.  In 1980, the regional engineer 
for the SWCB noticed that many residents of Rivermont Acres were purchasing 
water treatment systems for their wells.266  State agencies investigated and 
found the groundwater polluted by an alphabet soup of chemicals: ―arsenic, 
cadmium, carbon disulfide, chloride, iron, lead, manganese, phenols, sodium, 
sulfate, hydrogen sulfide, and zinc,‖ with highest quantities of carbon disulfide 
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and phenols.267  Although the chemical concentrations were not officially 
considered carcinogenic by governmental agencies, former residents of 
Rivermont Acres report a high incidence of cancers which developed at a young 
age.268  Avtex did not deal with the source of the pollution problem.  Instead, 
the company simply purchased the majority of the Rivermont Acres 
properties.269
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Chapter 6 
Controlling Technological Momentum by Trial and Error: Efforts and Obstacles 
   
From 1980 on, the cumulative problems associated with chemical waste 
at the Front Royal rayon plant took on a momentum of their own, albeit a 
disorganized momentum that moved in fits and starts.  The final years of the 
rayon plant saw remarkable fluctuations in power dynamics between a broad 
cast of characters, including Avtex‘s Chairman John Gregg, the Commonwealth 
of Virginia, the EPA, branches of the U.S. national security apparatus, and the 
South Fork of the Shenandoah River.  The numerous environmental laws 
passed between 1946 and 1980 gave the state and federal governments a 
variety of tools to try and knock the rayon plant out of its toxic slump.  The 
1946 State Water Control Law required American Viscose to curb its chemical 
discharges into the South Fork of the Shenandoah River.  A 1959 addition to 
the law allowed the SWCB to levy a substantial fine against AVC after a major 
fish kill in the South Fork.  The 1972 Clean Water Act gave the state and 
federal governments enforcement power to control discharge of pollutants into 
surface waters.  The EPA set water quality standards, delegating to the states 
the responsibility of issuing and monitoring the National Pollutant Discharge 
Elimination System (NPDES) permits, which designated the specific amounts of 
polluting chemicals that any facility can discharge.270   
The discovery in 1980 of well-water contamination in the Rivermont 
Acres community garnered Avtex increased attention from regulatory agencies.  
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The EPA listed Avtex‘s 440 acres as a potential toxic site under the newly-
enacted Superfund Act and began to study the facility in more depth.  The 
Superfund law empowered the EPA to identify contaminated sites, determine 
liability, and enforce cleanup.  In 1983, spurred on by evidence of carbon 
disulfide, arsenic, and phenol contamination in the aquifer beneath the Avtex 
site, the EPA added the company to its national priority list.  As part of the 
required remediation, Avtex enacted certain reforms.  The company purchased 
the homes in Rivermont Acres with contaminated wells.  In addition, the plant‘s 
wastewater treatment plant began to process waste viscose rather than 
landfilling it and started pumping and treating groundwater in an attempt to 
contain chemical migration.  The remediation efforts were insufficient to keep 
the plant from official designation; Avtex became Virginia‘s largest Superfund 
site in 1986.271   
Violations of environmental laws were long a part of the company‘s 
operating culture.  In testimony before Congress, an EPA official stated that 
Avtex violated the terms of its NPDES permit approximately 2,000 times 
between 1980 and 1989.  In November 1988, after repeated warnings and 
citations, the Commonwealth of Virginia sued Avtex for $19.3 million for non-
compliance with the NPDES permit.272  It is interesting to note that although 
the state had a clear interest in pushing Avtex to clean up its act, it did not file 
suit until pushed to do so by a citizen lawsuit against Avtex.  Under the Clean 
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Water Act, citizens can sue polluters directly, and in October 1988, the Natural 
Resources Defense Council (NRDC) filed a notice of intent to sue ―because of the 
slow pace of state officials.‖  The state responded with their own lawsuit against 
Avtex within a month, superseding the NRDC action.273 
Upon hearing of the Commonwealth of Virginia‘s lawsuit, Avtex‘s 
Chairman, John Gregg shut down the plant in early November of 1988 and 
turned to the federal government for help.  Gregg blamed ―foreign competition‖ 
and the high price of raw materials for the plant‘s closure, but the increasing 
cleanup costs and fines must have also played a role.274  Most importantly, 
however, closing the factory allowed Gregg to engage in brinkmanship with 
several federal defense agencies.  At the height of the Cold War, the agencies 
needed to keep Avtex in business, if only for long enough to arrange a new 
supplier of a specialized product made only at Avtex in Front Royal: carbonized 
(or carbonizable) rayon, a critical component of certain military armaments and 
aerospace technologies.275  Virginia Senator John Warner helped broker a 
federal bailout by securing $43 million in contracts from the Department of 
Defense and the National Aeronautic and Atmospheric Administration (NASA).  
Warner declared, ―It is essential to our national security to keep this plant 
operating.‖  Avtex had to hand over its patent rights to the carbonizable rayon 
manufacturing process to NASA, but the company survived, reopening the 
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Front Royal plant on November 10, 1989.276  Avtex settled the lawsuit with the 
Commonwealth of Virginia by agreeing to pay certain fines, fix safety violations, 
and clean up its mess.  However, little changed in the coming months, and 
safety and environmental conditions continued to deteriorate. 
Between November 1988 and November 1989, Avtex broke the terms of 
its lawsuit settlement, violated its NPDES permit on at least ninety-nine days, 
and received a cleanup order from the EPA that required Avtex and FMC 
Corporation—the facility‘s owner from 1963-1976—to decontaminate the site‘s 
groundwater at a cost of roughly $9.1-million.277  The rayon plant was self-
destructing due to decades of flawed waste disposal practices, but the final blow 
came from a chemical not directly involved in rayon manufacturing.  In April of 
1989, during routine monitoring studies, SWCB scientists found highly-toxic 
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) in the tissue of fish in the Shenandoah River 
downstream of the Avtex site.  Following Clean Water Act protocols, SWCB 
scientists routinely ―monitor[ed] fish tissue and sediment‖ to detect aquatic 
contamination.278  They painstakingly traced the PCBs back to Avtex.  Further 
inquiry showed that the materials originated in a blown-out electrical 
transformer on the roof the plant.  Records revealed that Avtex had knowingly 
discharged the pollutants into the South Fork for multiple years.   
In August 1989, the Commonwealth of Virginia filed a second lawsuit 
against Avtex Fibers, focused this time on the PCB violations.  The EPA‘s $9.1-
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million groundwater cleanup order followed in early November.  Then on 
November 9, 1989, the State Water Control Board took the unusual step of 
voting to revoke Avtex‘s NPDES permit.  The situation demonstrated a profound 
reversal: during World War II, the river‘s aquatic species had few defenders; no 
limits existed on pollutants from the rayon plant; and environmental harms 
were not a priority for state or federal government.  Now a major industrial 
facility and regional employer, with close ties to the national defense apparatus, 
faced steep fines and legal action by both the state and federal government for 
harming the Shenandoah River ecosystem.  
The SWCB‘s permit revocation vote did not require the plant to shut 
down.  In the NPDES system, revocation of a permit differed from permit 
termination, keeping open the possibility of future reissuance.  In addition, 
Avtex had the right to appeal the Board‘s revocation order.  Instead, John Gregg 
chose once again to close the factory.  On November 10th, the day after the 
SWCB‘s vote, Gregg ordered the boiler room to shut down, cutting electricity for 
the entire facility.  Employees were left standing next to their machines in the 
dark with no idea what had happened or where to go.  John Torrence, FMC‘s 
manager of remediation for the Superfund site, said it took hours for the 
building to be evacuated.279  The sudden closure violated labor contracts and 
left over 400 workers unemployed with no warning.  For their part, Gregg and 
the other Avtex owners walked away largely unscathed; their company—Avtex 
Fibers-Front Royal, Inc.—declared bankruptcy three months later, leaving FMC 
and taxpayers to shoulder the cleanup costs.280     
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The actions of many managers of the rayon facility, particularly during 
its final years, reflect a degree of arrogance and carelessness with regard to the 
environment.  The on-going relationship between the rayon plant and U.S. 
military interests is one possible reason behind this attitude.  As the largest 
supplier of war-critical rayon tire cord during World War II, government 
requirements allowed American Viscose to ignore any environmental 
repercussions of their waste.  The situation changed rapidly after the war with 
Virginia‘s 1946 Water Control law; however, a sense of stasis remained at the 
factory, limiting further improvements to the waste treatment system.  By the 
1970s, when stronger environmental laws came into force, the rayon plant, now 
operated by Avtex Fibers, was again manufacturing a militarily-critical material.  
This time, however, Avtex was not just a major producer but the sole supplier.   
Connection to the powerful momentum of the Cold War military-
industrial complex provided a degree of shielding against environmental 
regulation, particularly in the final years of the plant‘s operating life.  During 
the 1960s, as part of the Cold War arms race and space race, scientists sought 
a material that could withstand high temperatures for use on rocket and 
missile nozzles.  The most effective material developed was called carbonized 
rayon, created by converting rayon into graphite fibers.  In the 1970s, Avtex 
purchased the patent to make the rayon yarn needed for carbonizable rayon.  
Although some of the rayon was used for tennis rackets and boat hulls, NASA 
and the Department of Defense were the main purchasers:   
Besides shuttle booster motors, the rayon material is critical to the 
MX and Trident 2 intercontinental ballistic missiles, the Delta, 
Atlas and Titan launch vehicles, reentry vehicles, and tactical 
missiles including AMRAAM, SRAM-2, Standard, Stinger and 
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Tomahawk. Avtex is a fifth-level subcontractor to U. S. rocket 
motor manufacturers.281 
 
Like American Viscose‘s importance during World War II as the largest 
manufacturer of high-tenacity rayon, Avtex held a crucial place during the Cold 
War as the sole producer of carbonized rayon.  By relying on Avtex, however, 
NASA and the military put themselves in a precarious position.  After Avtex 
closed the first time in 1988, defense industry contractors were told that if 
Avtex remained closed, the existing supply of carbonized rayon would last only 
until March 1989.282  Avtex‘s managers used this unique position to leverage 
the NASA and military contracts that allowed the company to reopen after its 
first closure in 1988. 
 These federal contracts came with no requirement to clean up the 
environmental or safety hazards at Avtex.  In essence, Avtex‘s supporters within 
the national security arena sanctioned the severe problems at the facility.  It 
seems possible that Avtex‘s truculence was a result, or at least a side effect, of 
its deep engagement with military interests—not because these interests 
encouraged pollution per se, but because it was a second tier concern.  During 
World War II and the Cold War, national security could, and often did, trump 
environmental regulations.  As a result, federal facilities often have worse rates 
of compliance with federal water quality laws than privately-owned plants.283  
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But times do change, and environmental damage can become so severe 
that attitudes change.  The political climate shifted somewhat following the 
inauguration of George H.W. Bush.  The EPA under Ronald Reagan was a weak 
agency, hesitant to use the full power of the Superfund Act against Avtex.  In 
contrast, Bush‘s appointee for EPA Administrator was William K. Reilly, a 
former president of the World Wildlife Fund, who promised enforcement of 
hazardous waste cleanup laws during his confirmation hearings. 
Internationally, some Cold War tensions had eased with liberalization of Soviet 
regimes in the Eastern Bloc and the U.S.S.R.284  Perhaps this helped Senator 
Warner to shift gears, stating in September 1989, after the PCB violations were 
confirmed, that the environment must take precedence over national security, 
and that Avtex should close if it was financially unable to stop polluting.285  He 
took a tour of the facility just before the end of its operational life, saying, ―As a 
lay person, I found it shocking… The management freely discussed that they 
could no longer operate this machinery because it was broken down, it was 
rusted, it leaked, and was presumably contaminated.‖286   
Ralph Bolgiano, the former SWCB biologist, theorized that Avtex shut the 
doors on November 10, 1989 expecting to be bailed out a second time.  He 
described a meeting that occurred immediately after the closure: 
I remember the [Avtex] plant manager saying, ―we‘ve got a real 
problem here.‖  And the EPA said… ―what‘s that?  We want to 
know about that.‖  And the plant manager said something like… 
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―we‘ve got all the viscose in those lines, and if we don‘t do 
something quick, it‘s going to harden up.‖  I remember the EPA 
guys saying, “well, is that going to hurt the river?”  There‘s this big 
long pause.  And the plant manager says, ―well, no.  But there‘s 
hundreds of millions of dollars worth of equipment that‘s going to 
be worthless.‖  And the EPA guy said, ―ok, next question.‖  He 
really didn‘t care.  It wasn‘t his job to care.  Nobody had told him, 
―save the plant.‖  And he didn‘t… That place hardened up, and it 
would have cost more to start it again than it was worth… That‘s 
the real reason they‘re gone.  They thought they would be coaxed 
into firing up again, and nobody coaxed.  Nobody blinked.287   
 
This story illustrates the tremendous power shift between the river and the 
factory in the decades between 1940 and 1989.  The Shenandoah had again 
attracted powerful allies willing—at least in this extreme instance—to privilege 
environmental protection over business interest.     
 
Figure 18.  Ralph Bolgiano at the rayon plant’s discharge pipe, no longer pumping out “hot, soapy, 
nasty water,” on November 11, 1989, the day after the facility closed.  Source: Virginia DEQ, “An 
Environmental History: The 1980s,” http://www.deq.state.va.us/history/1980s.html  
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Shutting down with no preparation did indeed leave chemical chaos 
behind, destroying costly machinery and creating hazardous conditions for 
others to clean up.  Chemicals remained in pipelines, machines, and 
laboratories.  Waste viscose hardened in the lines, rendering much of the 
equipment unsalvageable.  As the EPA began the slow process of 
decontamination, they found dangerous conditions inside a devastated factory.  
Multiple potentially hazardous chemicals used to manufacture rayon were 
stored inside the plant, ―such as carbon disulfide, sodium hydroxide, ethylene 
diamine, phenol, sulfuric acid, zinc salts, sodium sulfate, sodium hypochlorite, 
solvents, and fuels.‖288  As the closed facility steadily degraded after 1989, 
containment and cleanup became more difficult and potentially dangerous.   
Over time, off-gassing from clogged pipes and sewer systems created 
concentrations of carbon disulfide and hydrogen sulfide gases in the buildings 
that were both toxic and potentially explosive.  In other locations, the acids 
used in the acid bath stage had eaten through pipes, sewers, manhole covers, 
even concrete.  The PCB discharge into the South Fork had contaminated the 
storm sewer system for the entire facility.  By all accounts, the place was a 
mess.  A 1993 Halliburton report recommending remediation procedures 
describes some of the conditions: 
Solid and semisolid viscose and crumb remain in process vessels, 
and piping contains liquid process chemicals. Carbon disulfide in 
concentrations up to 20,000 ppm may be present in the viscose 
liquids and slurries. Dried viscose hangs from process equipment 
and crumb is strewn amid the equipment within the churn and 
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mix rooms. Laboratory chemicals are isolated within locked 
rooms.289 
 
Descriptions of pictures taken in March 1987 by former employee Barry Mills 
show that similarly grim conditions existed several years before the plant 
closed: ―dark rooms full of rusted machines, walkways covered with slime, open 
vats of acid, gaping holes where chemicals ate through concrete floors and, 
covering almost everything, the white residue of evaporating acids.‖290 
 The EPA took on the task of decontaminating the buildings to the extent 
that they could.  The acid building was considered too structurally unstable 
due to corrosion and was simply demolished.  In the end, the EPA ascertained 
that the buildings were so contaminated that the best option was to remove 
them all, opening the land for re-development.  One of the final site remediation 
projects continuing as of 2010 is the removal of the plant‘s sewer system.  The 
Army Corps of Engineers undertook the actual demolition of the Avtex 
buildings.  It is a point of pride with John Torrence, also reflected on the Corps‘ 
website, that significant quantities of materials, including ―structural steel, 
pipes, valves, ducts, metal siding, etc. [were] disposed of as recycled material 
for melting and reuse.  Concrete and stone [were] crushed to pebble size for 
beneficial reuse on site.‖291  Visitors to the site today can still see piles of 
crushed brick awaiting use to fill and stabilize the sulfate and viscose basins.   
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 Those viscose basins, the major source of groundwater contamination 
from the rayon plant, however, remain precarious over twenty years after rayon 
production ceased.  The eight viscose basins filled prior to 1958 had 
substantially dried and decomposed; the EPA determined that these could be 
capped and left on-site as part of the remediation.292  The three newer, leaking 
pits remain on-site and continue to leak.  As Exponent Engineering notes, 
waste viscose is 85% water with a soft, rubbery consistency: ―this type of 
material has never been remediated before, and its low load-bearing capacity 
precludes the use of heavy equipment that would normally be employed.‖293  
Without the ability to use bulldozers to excavate the material, the only option at 
present is to pump out leachate from the viscose basins to prevent further 
percolation into the groundwater and monitor the results. 
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Figure 19.  Partial view of a full waste viscose basin, April 2009.  The three newer basins, filled 
between 1958-1983, are responsible for contaminating groundwater beneath the site. 
Photo by the author. 
 
 As this  problem highlights, remediation efforts on a Superfund site, like 
the waste treatment procedures at an operational rayon plant, are far from 
perfect.  A tremendous amount of waste remains on the 440-acre site, either in 
landfills or in capped basins, requiring on-going monitoring to ensure that 
contaminants do not spread again in the future.  By law, the EPA has to 
consider questions of cost, feasibility and effectiveness when deciding on a 
course of action, as well as the extent to which it will meet standards for 
protection of human and ecological health.  In the case of the earlier viscose 
basins and various other contaminated landfill materials, capping the sites with 
soil, installing leachate drains, and long-term monitoring of the sites are 
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considered the best cost-effective options.  Maximizing safety and cleanup is not 
necessarily the goal; indeed, there is a philosophical dilemma of whether it is 
possible to maximize cleanup.  Like the calcium sulfate and zinc hydroxide 
removed from the rayon plant‘s waste stream or the fly ash collected from the 
boiler plant, whatever toxics are removed from the 440 acres beside the South 
Fork must go somewhere.  The materials not buried or reused on site now 
reside in various hazardous waste landfills in multiple locations including Ohio, 
Utah, and Canada.294
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Chapter 7 
The Values of Precaution 
 
The history of technology offers numerous examples of relationships like 
the river-plant complex formed by the rayon plant at Front Royal and the South 
Fork of the Shenandoah River.  Courtaulds, Ltd. and its AVC subsidiaries, the 
original plant owners, innovated the viscose rayon-manufacturing technology 
and initiated the relationship with the South Fork, in search of economic gain.  
The plant opened in an era when water quality protection was a side issue, the 
domain of sport fishermen, public health officials, and sanitary engineers.  
Legal regulation of industrial pollution, in most instances, seemed to receive 
little consideration.  Given its legacy of contamination, descriptions of the Front 
Royal rayon plant as ―state of the art‖ in 1940, with a recovery system capable 
of reclaiming chemicals and keeping waste out of the river,295 speak volumes to 
the assumptions and understandings of the time regarding chemical pollution.  
Combining such limited foreknowledge with the agency of ecological 
systems—the South Fork‘s ―life of its own beyond our control‖296—creates a 
dangerous scenario, played out time and again as modern technological 
systems utilize more raw materials and produce more toxic wastes.  For the 
rayon plant at Front Royal, World War II was the turning point, forcing 
expansion of the plant‘s technological system with astonishing rapidity, adding 
tremendous mass to the technology‘s momentum, and placing the river, and the 
environment in general, at the lowest level of consideration.  Dismantling that 
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momentum took forty-nine years.  Changes in societal concern for the 
environment led to a steady strengthening of environmental laws, culminating 
in almost a decade of trial and error efforts by the federal government, the 
Commonwealth of Virginia, sportsmen, homeowners, and many more to force 
the rayon plant into regulatory compliance.  Even today, twenty-one years after 
Avtex closed, remnants of the rayon factory‘s technological momentum continue 
to interact with the river, as efforts to remediate contamination at the site 
continue. 
Similarly, despite societal shifts toward environmental protection since 
World War II, social constructs from that era continue to haunt present-day 
efforts to prevent harm to ecological systems.  Judgments regarding the 
primacy of military and economic needs over environmental protection went 
unquestioned in the years immediately following World War II.  The ―good‖ 
things provided by the rayon plant—materials to win a war and strengthen 
national security, products for consumers, paychecks and tax dollars for the 
community—had the highest value to the most people and were thus assumed 
to be most important.  The benefits outweighed, and perhaps even justified, the 
―bad‖ pollution flowing into the Shenandoah River.  These types of value 
judgments remain common in environmental disputes today.297 
As the history of the river and factory demonstrates, however, human 
benefit and environmental harm exist in two physically interconnected but 
morally separate spheres.  The moral necessity of defeating Nazi Germany on 
tires made with rayon cord had no impact on the ability of riverine life to 
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withstand the massive onslaught of chemical waste during the war.  Indeed, 
none of the human enrichment derived from the rayon plant at Front Royal 
could ameliorate any of the physical harm done to the Shenandoah River.  
Likewise, neither the war nor the plant‘s employees caused the harm directly.  
Aquatic species died because concentrations of chemicals, nutrients, and 
particulate matter reached a level that aquatic insects, plants, fish, and other 
river life could not survive.  The river has agency; it also has limits.  The 
unpredictability of the Shenandoah River ecosystem escapes full human 
understanding, but when it comes to pollution—of any sort—the river cannot 
decide whether or not to die; it can only respond to changes in chemistry.   
 Current environmental laws do a reasonable job of taking this reality into 
account.  An even more hopeful path would change the balance between rivers 
and factories in the future even further, placing the burden of proof on the 
factory to demonstrate its ability to prevent damage to the river in advance.  
Such a precautionary approach recognizes the agency of ecological systems and 
the limits inherent in human understanding of these systems.  A formally-
articulated concept of precaution exists already in scientific, advocacy, and 
global governmental circles.  The values of this Precautionary Principle call for 
protection of health and environment in advance of moving forward with new 
technologies, even ―in the absence of environmental certainty,‖ as opposed to   
current policies such as risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis 
[that] give the benefit of the doubt to new products and 
technologies, which may later prove harmful. And when damage 
occurs, victims and their advocates have the difficult task of 
proving that a product or activity was responsible. The 
precautionary principle shifts the burden of proof, insisting that 
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those responsible for an activity must vouch for its harmlessness 
and be held responsible if damage occurs.298  
 
The precautionary principle works hand-in-hand with the ―multilinear‖ nature 
of technological development and of human interactions with the natural world.  
The concept does not advocate a single designated outcome, rather it sets limits 
around multilinear developments, seeking to close off the most 
environmentally-harmful paths before they are taken.  
Responding to calamitous pollution problems both in the Shenandoah 
River and around the world during the decades between 1940-1989, humans 
succeeded in shifting the power dynamics between the Shenandoah River and 
the rayon factory at Front Royal.  This demonstrates the ability of human 
actions to counter the momentum of technological systems.  Such momentum 
belongs to the human sphere; it is not an autonomous force outside of human 
control.  As such, these technological systems, built by humans, can and 
should be judged by human values and self-interest.  In contrast to ecological 
systems that have agency beyond human control, technological systems can 
incorporate and respond to changes in values.  Thomas Hughes agrees that 
―contingencies and catastrophes‖ are not the only forces capable of breaking 
technological momentum; a change in values might do so as well.299   
This is a difficult goal.  As Hughes also intimates, the technological 
momentum surrounding many human-built systems includes a multiplicity of 
values—from greed to grace—gathered over the years of a technology‘s 
development and utilization.  As the history of the rayon-plant complex at Front 
                                                 
298
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299
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Royal demonstrates, merging or replacing those values with newer ones that 
place limits around human desire may take decades.  Shifting societal values 
toward precaution will undoubtedly seem counterintuitive and uncomfortable to 
a great many people.  The process of changing values may be messy and 
chaotic, rife with failures and unintended consequences, but it is, ultimately, 
possible. 
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